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ABSTRACT 
POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND DETERMINANTS OF GOVERNANCE 
UNDER PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY 
by Matthew C. Bluem 
May 2018 
This study examines the theory that quality of governance is largely dependent 
upon political accountability, and that the effect of political accountability on governance 
varies based on three main determinants: level of democracy, level of information 
available to the public, and diversification of the economy (Adserà et al. 2003).  With 
quality of governance, represented by the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators 
(WGI), as the dependent variable, this study considers how these three independent 
variables, and several control variables, affect governance quality. Incorporating data 
from 2010 – 2015 for 143 countries in both cross-sectional OLS and fixed effects panel 
regression analysis, this study finds that level of democracy has a direct relationship with 
voice and accountability and regularity quality, and an inverse relationship with 
governance effectiveness and rule of law.  Information available to the public has a direct 
relationship with governance effectiveness, while diversification of the economy has a 
direct relationship with governance effectiveness and regularity quality, and an inverse 
relationship with rule of law and control of corruption.  
This research also demonstrates that several other factors affect governance 
quality.  Level of economic development, openness to trade, level of education, size of 
population, freedom of the press, cell phone penetration rate, and state fragility all play a 
role in determining at least some aspects of governance quality.  While these variables 
 iii 
are all shown to have a significant relationship with governance, they are still only part of 
the equation.  Future research should endeavor to enhance the current findings and strive 
to identify the other factors that may contribute to governance quality.     
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CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION  
This research examines why some countries exhibit better governance than others 
and identifies which variables play the greatest role in determining governance quality, 
with governance defined as the capacity of a government to design, formulate, and 
implement policies (World Bank 1994, 14).  The literature on determinants of governance 
has focused on a variety of potential economic, social, and political variables.  While 
there is a consensus that the level of economic development affects governance (La Porta 
et al. 1999, Islam and Montenegro 2002, Adserà et al. 2003, Al-Marhubi 2004, Lee and 
Whitford 2009, Garcia-Sanchez et al. 2013, Adkisson and McFerrin 2014, Rontos et al. 
2015), the role of other variables has not clearly been identified.  This research examines 
the theory that quality of governance is largely dependent upon political accountability, 
defined as the public’s ability to hold government officials accountable (Adserà et al. 
2003).  As political accountability increases, governance quality should improve (Barro 
1973, Ferejohn 1986, Adserà et al. 2003).  However, it is theorized that the effect of 
political accountability on governance varies based on three main determinants: level of 
democracy, level of information available to the public, and diversification of the 
economy (Adserà et al. 2003).  With quality of governance as the dependent variable, this 
study considers how these three independent variables affect governance quality. 
The quality of governance is represented by the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI) produced by the World Bank (2015).  The WGI reports governance 
quality indicators for 215 countries along six dimensions: voice and accountability, 
political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regularity quality, 
rule of law, and control of corruption.   
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Level of democracy is represented by data from the Polity IV Project by Marshall 
et al. (2016) which measures level of democracy on a scale of 0-10 for 167 countries.  
Level of information available to the public is represented by data from the International 
Telecommunications Union (2016a) on the percentage of individuals using the internet 
for over 200 countries.  Diversification of the economy is represented by the number of 
unique harmonized system (HS) product codes exported by over 200 countries available 
from the World Bank (2017). 
Statement of Problem 
This study examines why some countries exhibit better governance than others 
and identifies whether governance performance is affected by level of democracy, level 
of information available to the public, and diversification of the economy.  For the 
purpose of this study, countries are considered to exhibit better governance when they 
receive a score one standard deviation above the mean in the six Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (2015).  One standard deviation above the mean is used to represent better 
governance as any fixed score would be arbitrary.  With this definition of better 
governance, the countries that receive the top scores in the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators will set the norm for what other countries should be striving to achieve in 
terms of governance quality. 
Research Questions 
1. How does level of democracy affect quality of governance? 
2. How does the degree of information available to the public affect quality of 
governance? 
3. How does diversification of the economy affect quality of governance? 
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Hypotheses 
1. H1: Quality of governance has a direct relationship with the level of democracy. 
2. H2: Quality of governance has a direct relationship with the information available 
to the public. 
3. H3: Quality of governance has a direct relationship with the diversification of the 
economy.  
Purpose Statement 
The purpose of this study is to contribute to the literature on determinants of 
governance by testing the effect that level of democracy, degree of information available 
to the public, and diversification of the economy have on quality of governance, with 
governance quality as the dependent variable and level of democracy, degree of 
information available to the public, and diversification of the economy as the independent 
variables being tested.  
Significance of Study 
The existing literature on determinants of governance has focused on three main 
strands as explanatory variables: economic, political, and cultural (La Porta et al. 1999, 
Adserà et al. 2003, Al-Marhubi 2004, and Rontos et al. 2015).  The results of these 
studies have largely shown that level of economic development plays a significant role in 
governance quality, but wide-spread agreement has not been reached regarding the role 
of other factors and to what extent they matter.  To build on these analyses, this study 
considers updated data on three additional determinants: level of democracy, level of 
information available to the public, and diversification of the economy.  
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The remaining chapters of this dissertation are organized as follows.  Chapter two 
includes a description of the concept of governance and governance quality, a summary 
of the main empirical studies pertaining to governance quality, and an overview of the 
study’s principal-agent theoretical framework.  Chapter three describes the methodology 
used in this study and the dependent and independent variables under analysis.  Chapter 
four presents the results of the analysis described in the methodology section.  Finally, 
chapter five includes a discussion of the results of this study, a description of the 
contributions and limitations of this research, and an overview of possible considerations 
for future studies.         
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CHAPTER II – LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section provides an overview of the concept of governance and governance 
quality.  It explains how governance is interpreted and studied from a quantitative 
perspective and provides a review of the main literature on the topic. It then provides a 
description of the main theoretical framework of this study.  
Overview of Governance and Governance Quality 
Governance is often associated with concepts such as institutional quality, rule of 
law and corruption, and how power is exercised in society (Al Marhubi 2004).  A 
growing body of literature has emerged which indicates that these factors may affect 
economic growth and poverty reduction.  For example, Scully (1988) finds that the 
economies of “politically open” countries which respect rule of law and property rights 
grow three times faster than countries that do not (652).  Mauro (1995) indicates that 
corruption is associated with lower economic growth.  Barro (1997) finds that property 
rights are correlated with higher economic growth.  Keefer and Knack (1997) and Chong 
and Calderon (2000) indicate that poor institutions result in lower economic growth.  
Furthermore, the World Bank (2000) maintains, “Poorly functioning public sector 
institutions and weak governance are major constraints to growth and equitable 
development in many developing countries” (1).  
Consequently, interest in the topic of governance has grown and has become 
widespread throughout the social science literature (Scully 1988, Mauro 1995, Barro 
1997, Knack and Keefer 1997, Kaufmann et al. 1999, Chong and Calderon 2000, Bora 
2014).  Concepts of governance can now be found in studies of public administration, 
political science, international relations, development studies, and environmental 
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management, among others (Chhotray and Stoker 2009).  In these studies, notions of 
governance range from narrow perceptions of public sector management (Kaufmann et 
al. 2010), to broad views of entire international social systems (Rosenau 1995).  Due to 
these different interpretations, the concept of governance has been critiqued by some as a 
“fuzzy” concept which lacks practical clarity (Rosenau 1995, Al Marhubi 2004, Chhotray 
and Stoker 2009, Kaufmann et al. (2010).   
Indeed, a review of the literature reveals a variety of definitions.  Chhotray and 
Stoker (2009) state, “Governance is about the rules of collective decision-making in 
settings where there are a plurality of actors or organizations and where no formal control 
system can dictate the terms of the relationship between these actors and organizations” 
(3).  Kaufmann et al. (2010) define governance as “the traditions and institutions by 
which authority in a country is exercised. This includes (a) the process by which 
governments are selected, monitored and replaced; (b) the capacity of the government to 
effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and (c) the respect of citizens and 
the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them” 
(4).   
Al-Marhubi (2004), argues that governance “includes the norms defining political 
action, the institutional framework in which the policy-making process takes place, and 
the mechanisms and processes by which public policies are designed, implemented, and 
sustained” (395).  Rosenau (1995), sees governance as “the command mechanism of a 
social system,” maintaining that governance, “encompasses the activities of governments, 
but it also includes the many other channels through which ‘commands’ flow in the form 
of goals framed, directives issued, and policies pursued” (Rosenau, 14).  To lend clarity 
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to this ambiguity, this study adopts the World Bank’s (1994) narrow definition of 
governance as the capacity of government to design, formulate, and implement policies 
(14).     
If governance is difficult to define, it is perhaps even more challenging to quantify 
and model.  Isham et al. (1997) note, “Governance, like religion, is a broad topic that 
inspires strong beliefs and is difficult to measure reliably” (219).  Empirical studies have 
used a variety of proxy measures for governance, including efficiency in taxation, quality 
of infrastructure, measurements of corruption, protection of property rights, rule of law, 
and a variety of public health and education data (La Porta et al. 1999, Islam and 
Montenegro 2002, Adserà et al. 2003, Al-Marhubi 2004, Lee and Whitford 2009, 
Méndez-Picazo et al. 2012, Garcia-Sanchez et al. 2013, Adkisson and McFerrin 2014, 
Rontos et al. 2015).  An increasing number of researchers have also begun to incorporate 
the World Bank’s (2015) Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) into their studies 
which pulls together many of these proxy measurements into one index (Islam and 
Montenegro 2002, Adserà et al. 2003, Al-Marhubi 2004, Lee and Whitford 2009, 
Méndez-Picazo et al. 2012, Garcia-Sanchez et al. 2013, Adkisson and McFerrin 2014, 
Rontos et al. 2015).   
First developed by Kaufmann et al. (1999) in a working paper for the World 
Bank, the WGI is regularly updated and has grown to include governance quality 
indicators for the years 1996 – 2015 for 215 countries along six dimensions: voice and 
accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, 
regularity quality, rule of law, and control of corruption (World Bank 2015).  The data 
used to construct the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) come from two subjective 
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sources: country ratings largely developed by commercial risk rating agencies, and 
surveys of residents conducted by various international and nongovernmental 
organizations (Kaufmann et al. 1999).   
The WGI condenses over 300 related measurements of governance into its six 
aggregate indicators (Kaufmann et al. 1999).  The first dimension, voice and 
accountability, speaks to perceptions regarding freedoms of expression and association, 
freedom of the media, and the ability of citizens to choose their own government.  The 
second indicator, political stability and absence of violence, represents perceptions of 
political instability, and the likelihood of politically-motivated violence and terrorism.  
Government effectiveness is the third category and includes perceptions of quality in 
areas such as public services, civil services, public policy formation and implementation, 
and the extent to which citizens believe the government is committed to these policies.  
The fourth dimension is regulatory quality, which measures perceptions of the presence 
of market-friendly government policies and regulations.  The fifth category, rule of law, 
represents perceptions around how well the rules of society are obeyed, including the 
enforcement of contracts, confidence in the courts and police, and expectations of crime 
and violence.  The sixth and final dimension, control of corruption, speaks to perceptions 
regarding the degree to which public power is used to advance private interests through 
both petty and grand forms of corruption, and the influence that private parties have over 
state functions (World Bank 2015).   
Empirical Studies 
While there is an emerging consensus that governance plays an important role in 
development, there are still many questions related to what factors affect governance.  
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This gap in the empirical literature has been attributed to the conceptual and definitional 
problems addressed previously, and to the lack of a clear empirical path to follow (Al-
Marhubi 2004).  The literature on the topic which has emerged shows a variety of results 
depending on the measurements and the data used.  
The studies investigating determinants of governance from an econometric 
perspective use the terms government and governance interchangeably and largely focus 
on three main sets of explanatory variables: economic, political, and social/cultural (La 
Porta et al. 1999, Islam and Montenegro 2002, Adserà et al. 2003, Al-Marhubi 2004, 
Garcia-Sanchez et al. 2013, Adkisson and McFerrin 2014, Rontos et al. 2015).  Many of 
these studies use very similar dependent and independent variables, yet come to different 
conclusions regarding which factors may affect quality of governance.   
In a seminal study by La Porta et al. (1999), the authors establish an empirical 
framework for testing determinants of government which has subsequently been adopted 
by a number of authors.  For the dependent variable, representing quality of government, 
La Porta et al. (1999) use a combination of datasets measuring government performance, 
such as property rights, business regulation, public goods, and political freedom.  For 
independent variables, the authors use a host of economic, political and social/cultural 
country characteristics.  For economic indicators, per capita income is used as well as 
latitude, based on the argument that temperate climates should have better agriculture and 
health patterns, and should therefore be wealthier.  For political and social/cultural 
dimensions, the authors use national ethnic heterogeneity, legal system origin, and 
religion (La Porta et al. 1999). 
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 After regression analysis, La Porta et al. (1999) come to a number of conclusions.  
For the economic variables, both per capita income and latitude are shown to have a 
strong direct effect on government performance, indicating that the richer the country the 
higher the quality of government.  Although, the authors admit there could be 
endogeneity issues with per capita income since there is evidence that the direction of 
influence could run both ways between government quality and level of economic 
development.  For political variables, the authors find that ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization inversely impacts government performance. The more fractionalization 
within the society the poorer the government performs in areas such as efficiency, 
provision of public goods, and political freedom.  In regard to legal origin, the authors 
find that both socialist and civil law countries, and to a lesser degree German and 
Scandinavian law countries, have a much more interventionist government performance 
than common law countries. Finally, for cultural theories, the authors find that Catholic 
and Muslim majority countries are associated with poorer government performance 
relative to Protestant majority countries. However, when per capita income and latitude 
are controlled for, the influence of religion decreases greatly.  For these reasons, La Porta 
et al. (1999) state that the political variables of ethnolinguistic fractionalization and legal 
origin have the largest impact on quality of government, but the economic variables of 
per capita income, latitude, and the cultural variable of religion, cannot be discounted 
either.  
Subsequent studies have built on La Porta et al.’s (1999) framework, testing 
updated variables or different proxies.  Most of these studies have examined the extent to 
which various economic, political and social/cultural variables affect quality of 
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government or quality of governance.  As noted earlier, government and governance have 
largely been used interchangeably in this strand of literature.  It has also become 
increasingly common in many studies to use the World Bank’s World Governance 
Indicators (1999, 2015) to represent government or governance quality.   
Islam and Montenegro (2002) assess the determinants of governance by 
examining the relationship between two different measurements of governance and 
several explanatory variables.  For the first measurement of governance, the authors use 
an average of five different indicators of political and economic risk, including 
corruption, rule of law, quality of bureaucracy, repudiation of contracts, and risk of 
expropriation.  For the second indicator of governance, the authors use the World Bank’s 
World Governance Indicators (1999).  For independent variables, Islam and Montenegro 
(2002) use several economic, political and social/cultural variables.  For economic 
variables, the authors use gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, income inequality, 
degree of economic openness, and proportion of commodity exports.  For political 
variables, the authors use legal system origin; English, French, Scandinavian, German, or 
Socialist, percent state ownership of the press, and a measurement of freedom of the 
press, an index of governmental checks and balances, and an index showing openness to 
rent-seeking opportunities. For social/cultural, the authors use ethnic heterogeneity and 
income inequality.   
In analysis of their data, Islam and Montenegro (2002) provide a number of 
conclusions.  The authors find that openness to trade, openness to rent-seeking, ratio of 
primary exports to total exports, checks and balances in government, level of national 
income, freedom of the press, and French legal origin all affect quality of governance.  
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On the other hand, Islam and Montenegro (2002) find that level of income inequality, 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization, state ownership of the press, and English, Scandinavian, 
German, and Socialist legal system origin do not appear to affect quality of governance.  
In their study on political accountability, Adserà et al. (2003) examine which 
variables affect quality of government, with the dependent variable alternately as four 
different measurements of political and economic risk: corruption, bureaucratic quality, 
rule of law, and risk of expropriation of property.  The main independent variables the 
authors test are level of democracy and free circulation of independent newspapers.  For 
control variables, the authors use a host of economic, political, and social/cultural data. 
Economic variables include per capita income, percentage of fuel exports compared to 
total exports, an index of product concentration, and a measurement of economic 
openness. For political variables, the authors use type of legal code, constitutional 
framework, and size of government expenditures.  For social/cultural variables, the 
authors use religion and ethnic fractionalization (Adserà et al. 2003).  
In analysis, Adserà et al. (2003) conclude that the factors which appear to have 
the biggest effect on government quality are free circulation of independent newspapers, 
level of democracy, percent of fuel exports, and level of export concentration.  As 
newspaper readership, democracy, and export concentration increase, government quality 
across the board improves.  Vice versa, government quality declines in all categories as 
the proportion of the economy focused on fuel exports expands.   The authors note that 
while diversification of the economy plays a role, their results indicate mainly that “the 
presence of a well-informed electorate in a democratic setting explains between one-half 
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and two-thirds of the variance in the levels of government performance and corruption” 
(Adserà et al. 2003, 479). 
For control variables, Adserà et al. (2003) report that the evidence is more mixed.  
Per capita income, English common law and French civil code are all associated with 
lower levels of corruption.  Federalist constitutions result in lower levels of corruption 
and improved bureaucracy.  Level of government expenditures relates to less corruption 
and increased bureaucratic quality.  Religion and ethnic fractionization, in general, do not 
play a role in corruption or rule of law, but Protestantism is positively associated with 
quality of bureaucracy while Catholicism and Islam have a negative effect.  Finally, trade 
openness does not have any statistically significant effect on any measurements of 
government quality assessed.   
Al-Marhubi (2004) examines the determinants of governance quality, rather than 
government quality.  To represent governance as the dependent variable, Al-Marhubi 
utilizes an average of the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) data 
(Kaufmann et al. 1999, 2002).  For independent variables, Al-Marhubi uses many of the 
same political, cultural, and economic factors used in earlier studies, such as 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization, legal tradition, distance from equator, religious 
affiliation, and per capita income; however, Al-Marhubi also includes openness to 
international trade and natural resource abundance in the equation.   
Al-Marhubi (2004) finds that strength of Western European influence, English 
common law legal origin, religious affiliation, represented by proportion of the 
population that is Protestant, openness to trade, and per capita income are all found to 
have a strong positive effect on quality of governance, while ethnolinguistic 
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fractionalization is found to have a negative effect, and abundance of natural resources is 
found to have no detectable effect.  In conclusion, Al-Marhubi (2004) finds that level of 
economic development, openness to trade, strength of Western European influence, legal 
system origin, and potentially religious affiliation, all have a measurable impact on 
quality of governance.  However, ethnolinguistic fractionalization and natural resource 
abundance appear to not.  Therefore, based on the strong correlations between economic 
development, openness and governance, and the weak correlations between religious 
affiliation and ethnolinguistic fractionalization, Al-Marhubi maintains that the results of 
his study show that countries are not necessarily destined to have poor governance based 
on cultural or historical reasons. Instead, there is evidence to believe that countries can 
“grow their way out of bad governance” (404) through greater integration with the global 
economy (Al-Marhubi 2004, 404).   
In a second study, Al-Marhubi (2005) further examines the relationship between 
quality of governance and economic openness.  According to Al-Marhubi (2005), 
integration with the global economy may lead countries to create better institutions of 
government to support the integration process and to help manage risk, resulting in 
improved governance quality.  The increased access to information and new ideas that 
come along with greater openness may also help to create a citizenry that is more 
demanding of its government (Al-Marhubi 2005). 
To investigate the potential relationship between governance and economic 
openness, Al-Marhubi (2005) conducts cross-country regressions with an average of the 
World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) as the dependent variable and 
level of economic openness, level of economic development, dummy variables for 
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developing countries and countries with British common law origins, percentage of 
citizens from the Protestant faith, ethnolinguistic fractionalization, strength of western 
European influence, and share of primary exports in GDP as the independent variables.  
In analysis of the results of several variations of the model, Al-Marhubi (2005) 
finds a positive and statistically significant relationship between economic openness and 
governance quality in all regressions, accounting for more than 12% of the variation in 
governance between countries. For control variables, Al-Marhubi (2005) reports that 
level of economic development, British common law origin, and strength of western 
European influence all appear to be positive and statistically significant with governance 
while developing country status and ethnolinguistic fractionalization are statistically 
significant yet negative.  However, as Al-Marhubi (2005) notes, ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization loses significance when level of economic development is included. 
Finally, share of primary exports in GDP and percentage of citizens from the Protestant 
faith are reported to have no statistically significant relationship with governance (Al-
Marhubi 2005). 
Brunetti and Weder (1999) also investigate the connection between economic 
openness and government performance.  Similar to Al-Marhubi (2005), the authors 
expect a positive relationship between these factors based on the argument that open 
economies allow citizens greater access to information and alternative ideas about 
governance from around the world, potentially leading them to demand better 
performance from their own governments (Brunetti and Weder 1999).  
To analyze the relationship between economic openness and quality of 
government, Brunetti and Weder (1999) conduct several regressions with four different 
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indicators of government quality, including measurements of rule of law, bureaucratic 
quality, security of property, and judiciary predictability alternately as the dependent 
variables, and level of economic openness, level of economic development, degree of 
democratic rights, ethnolinguistic fractionalization, percent of population of Protestant 
faith, and French legal origin as the independent variables.  In analysis of their results, 
Brunetti and Weder (1999) find that degree of democratic rights is significant in some 
models, but when all variables are included together, level of economic openness and 
level of economic development are the only variables that appear to have a statistically 
significant relationship with government quality.   
Lee and Whitford (2009) take a similar approach and examine how eight broad 
categories of independent variables affect government effectiveness.  With the World 
Bank’s government effectiveness indicator as the dependent variable, Lee and Whitford 
(2009) consider the role of legal origin, level of economic development, three measures 
of constitutional design (presidential versus parliamentary system, federal versus unitary 
systems, and type of electoral systems), the presence or absence of electoral fraud, 
military versus non-military leadership, and the land area of the country.  It’s not clear 
what theoretical basis the authors used to select these variables; however, in analysis, Lee 
and Whitford (2009) find that level of economic development is the only variable that has 
a statistically valid effect on government effectiveness, indicating that nearly 80 percent 
of the variance in government effectiveness is based on a country’s level of economic 
development.  
To advance the literature on determinants of governance, Rontos et al.  (2015) 
include data from a larger group of countries and incorporate slightly different proxies 
 17 
than their predecessors.  To represent quality of governance as the dependent variable, 
Rontos et al. (2015), use the Worldwide Governance Indicators from the World Bank 
(2015).  On the other side of the equation, Rontos et al. (2015) include four independent 
variables.  To determine the importance of economic institutions, Rontos et al. (2015) use 
gross national income per capita in purchasing power parity, an index of political rights, 
an index of civil liberties, and an index of human development.  They conclude gross 
national income per capita (ppp) is directly associated with all six dimensions of the 
World Governance Indicators.  Therefore, Rontos et al. (2015) conclude that higher 
levels of economic development are associated with higher quality of governance.   
For the political dimension, Rontos et al. (2015) find that both the civil liberties 
and political rights indices are inversely associated with governance quality.  Given that 
decreasing values in both these indices represent increasing political development, the 
inverse association indicates that civil governance rises as civil liberties and political 
rights improve (Rontos et al. 2015).  Finally, for the social dimension, Rontos et al. 
(2015) report that there is a strong correlation between the human development index and 
two of the six World Governance Indicators; government effectiveness and regularity 
quality.  However, there was not a statistically significant relationship between the human 
development index and the other four World Governance Indicators.  Therefore, in 
conclusion, Rontos et al. (2015) find that levels of economic development, scales of 
political rights and civil liberties, and scope of human development all have an impact on 
at least some dimensions of governance quality.   
In a related study, Adkisson and McFerrin (2014) explore the relationship 
between governance and two specific explanatory factors: level of economic 
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development and culture. While not incorporating the three-part institutional framework 
in many of the studies above, Adkisson and McFerrin, also use the six dimensions of 
governance from the Worldwide Governance Indicators as the dependent variables and 
two unique proxies to represent the determinants being tested. To represent level of 
economic development, Adkisson and McFerrin include real per capita gross domestic 
product (GDP) rather than per capita income, and to represent culture, they use two broad 
dimensions of culture condensed from the World Values Survey (WVS).  The results of 
their regression analysis show that both culture and level of economic development affect 
governance.  While economic development is shown to have a greater impact, culture 
plays a role as well.  The less traditional and “survival-oriented,” the better governed the 
country should be (Adkisson and McFerrin 2014, 447).   
Garcia-Sanchez et al. (2013) explore determinants of government effectiveness 
from a public administration perspective.  According to Garcia-Sanchez et al., the 
demand for government effectiveness is based upon the organizational environment in 
which it operates.  Specifically, Garcia-Sanchez et al. (2013) test how organizational 
environment and certain organizational and political characteristics affect government 
effectiveness.  With the World Bank government effectiveness indicator as the dependent 
variable, the independent variables are grouped into three separate categories.  Level of 
economic development and educational status are used to represent organizational 
environment, population density and proportion of women in national parliament are used 
to represent organizational characteristics, and an index measuring the level of constraints 
on policy change is used for political characteristics (Garcia-Sanchez et al. 2013).   
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After analysis, the authors maintain that all three categories of independent 
variables have a statistically significant effect on government effectiveness (Garcia-
Sanchez et al. 2013).  However, the degree of impact varies depending on level of 
economic development.  In lower-income countries, political constraints on policy 
change have the greatest effect on government effectiveness.  In middle-income 
countries, population density has the greatest effect on government effectiveness.  In 
higher-income countries, level of educational status and proportion of women in national 
parliament have the greatest impact on government effectiveness.  Therefore, Garcia-
Sanchez et al. (2013) maintain that organizational characteristics do play a role in 
government effectiveness.  
Democracy has also been argued to affect governance.  Brewer et al. (2007) use 
the World Governance Indicators (WGI) to examine how democracy affects government 
performance in Asian countries.  Examining three of the six WGIs specifically, the 
authors find that level of democracy affects only one aspect of government performance: 
voice and accountability.  Brewer et al. (2007) do not find a significant relationship 
between democracy and control of corruption, or democracy and government 
effectiveness.  On the other hand, the authors do report that level of economic 
development appears to have a direct and significant effect on all three measurements of 
government performance (Brewer et al. 2007).  
Charron and Lapuente (2009) also explore the role of democracy in promoting 
quality of government.  To represent quality of government as their dependent variable, 
the authors combine measurements of bureaucratic quality and level of perceived 
corruption into one index for 140 countries (Charron and Lapuente 2009).  The authors’ 
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main independent variables include level of democracy, level of economic development, 
level of trade openness, freedom of the press, ethnic fractionalization, and level of 
education (Charron and Lapuente 2009).  
Upon analysis, Charron and Lapuente (2009) find that democracy does indeed 
affect quality of government; however, the effect is conditional based on level of 
economic development.  According to the authors, the wealthier the country the greater is 
the impact that democracy has on quality of government (Charron and Lapuente 2009).  
While in poor countries there is little demand for investments in bureaucratic capacity, 
and hence quality of government, as countries become wealthier the demand for 
government quality increases and the importance of democracy in channeling this 
demand also increases (Charron and Lapuente 2009).  The authors note that while 
freedom of the press also appears to affect quality of government, trade openness, ethnic 
fractionalization, and level of education do not (Charron and Lapuente 2009). 
 Looking at the role of democracy as well, Nur-tegin and Czap (2012) find that 
one factor of governance, level of corruption, is higher in stable dictatorships than in 
unstable democracies.  While the authors note there is significant evidence in the 
literature showing stable democracies have lower levels of corruption than dictatorships, 
the performance of newly-democratized states is not as clear and is often assumed to be 
worse than in stable dictatorships (Nur-tegin and Czap 2012).  However, according to 
Nur-tegin and Czap (2012), the findings of their study show that countries are still better 
off as unstable democracies than as stable dictatorships in terms of corruption.  
Information available to the public appears to play a role in governance quality as 
well.  Toka (2008) examines the role of information on quality of governance and finds 
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that an electorate which is fully informed on political issues has a positive effect on at 
least some aspects of governance, specifically control of corruption, over multiple 
election cycles.  Toka (2008) notes, the effect of increased information available to the 
public may affect control of corruption more than other aspects of governance because 
those involved in corruption scandals are often forced out of office in result.  
Norris (2006) also examines how information available to the public affects 
governance.  Norris (2006) includes five measurements of governance alternately as the 
dependent variables: political stability, rule of law, government efficiency, regulatory 
quality, and least corruption.  For independent variables, Norris (2006) includes freedom 
of the press, level of economic development, colonial legacy, ethnic fictionalization, and 
size of population.  In analysis of her results, Norris (2006) reports that freedom of the 
press has a significant and positive relationship with all five governance variables.  
Furthermore, Norris (2006) notes that level of economic development is shown to be 
significant and positive and ethnic fractionalization is shown to be significant and 
negatively related to governance.  However, Norris (2006) notes that population size and 
colonial legacy do not appear to be significant in any of the regressions.  In conclusion, 
Norris (2006) argues that her study supports the assertion that a free press plays a vital 
role in promoting good governance.  
Related to freedom of the press, access to information may also play a role in 
governance quality.  Garcia-Murillo (2010) examines the effect of internet access on 
corruption and finds that while the number of internet users does affect levels of 
corruption, the strength of the relationship is not as strong as was expected.  With level of 
corruption as the dependent variable, the author investigates a host of economic and 
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political factors for independent variables.  In analysis of the regression results, Garcia-
Murillo (2010) finds that countries with larger populations tend to have higher levels of 
corruption, while countries with higher levels of income, greater freedom of the press, 
larger bureaucracies, better governance scores, and increased time spent by upper-level 
management in complying with government regulation, all equate with lower levels of 
corruption.  Garcia-Murillo (2010) maintains that as internet-based resources and tools 
develop, the impact of internet access on corruption is expected to increase.  
Additionally, it is worth noting that Garcia-Murillo’s (2010) data on internet access is 
from 2004 and updated data may generate different results.   
Khazaeli and Stockemer (2013) also examine the relationship between internet 
access and governance, with an expectation that increased internet access will result in 
greater access to information and improved governance.  The authors perform a pooled 
time-series analysis of 170 countries with governance, represented by an average of the 
six Word Governance Indicators (WGI), as the dependent variable, and internet access, 
level of economic development, degree of armed conflict in the country, federalism, and 
region as the independent variables (Khazaeli and Stockemer 2013). 
In analysis of their results, Khazaeli and Stockemer (2013) report that, as 
expected, level of internet access does indeed appear to have a significant and positive 
relationship with quality of governance.  The authors note that this relationship appears to 
be similar across all types of governments (Khazaeli and Stockemer 2013).  Level of 
economic development, population size, and region are also reported to have a significant 
and positive relationship with governance (Khazaeli and Stockemer 2013).  On the other 
hand, Khazaeli and Stockemer (2013) state that degree of armed conflict and federalism 
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do not appear to play a role in governance quality.  Looking at the results of their study, 
Khazaeli and Stockemer (2013) claim that their study contributes to the literature 
indicating that increased internet access has a positive effect on governance performance.  
Summary of Literature  
In analysis of the literature on determinants of government or governance quality, 
three main conclusions can be drawn.  First, there is a consensus across the literature that 
level of economic development appears to play a leading role in determining quality of 
governance (La Porta et al. 1999, Islam and Montenegro 2002, Adserà et al. 2003, Al-
Marhubi 2004, Lee and Whitford 2009, Garcia-Sanchez et al. 2013, Adkisson and 
McFerrin 2014, Rontos et al. 2015).  It stands to reason that quality of governance should 
improve as more resources to govern become available.  However, as some authors point 
out, there could be issues of endogeneity with this variable as the direction of influence 
between governance and national income most likely runs in both directions.  Income 
level may affect governance, but governance most likely also affects level of income (La 
Porta et al. 1999 Al-Marhubi 2004).   
 Second, extent of democratization also appears to play a significant role in 
quality of governance.  Again, this stands up to reason.  As citizens’ ability to hold their 
leaders accountable increases, so too should the quality of governance.   
Third, information available to the public is also reported to influence governance 
quality.  The more information the public has on government official performance, the 
easier it is to hold the government officials accountable.   
Other factors which might affect quality of governance are not as clear in the 
literature. Variables such as type of political system, degree of economic openness, 
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commodity export mix, and colonial legacy may also play a role.  Some studies have 
found conclusive evidence that these variables affect at least some aspects of governance, 
while others have not.  This may be due to the type of data and methodology used.  Social 
dimensions such as ethnic diversity and national religion may also have an influence, yet 
these factors are difficult to quantify.  Discounting the social/cultural variables due to 
normative nature of the variables and difficulties in their measurement, the determinants 
of governance which most frequently appear in the literature are level of national income, 
level of democracy, type of legal system, degree of economic openness, and export 
commodity mix.  This study advances the literature on determinants of governance 
quality by enhancing its theoretical foundations and incorporating new and updated 
variables for many of the determinants listed above.  
Theoretical Framework and Contributions to the Literature  
This study builds on a developing strand of literature where governance is 
described in terms of a principal–agent model.  In this view the principal, represented by 
the public, grants the agent, represented by the government official, specific powers to 
advance certain goals on the public’s behalf (Adserà et al. 2003).  In the perfect situation, 
the government official’s interests align directly with those of the public’s.  However, in 
reality the interests of these two parties often diverge.  Once in office government 
officials may decide to focus on their own political agenda, they may represent the 
interests of only a narrow segment of the public, or they might try to enrich themselves 
by taking advantage of the trappings of office rather than working on the public’s behalf 
(Adserà et al. 2003).  Consequently, the delegation of power from principal to agent often 
results in a suboptimal outcome for the public in terms of governance quality.  
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To address this delegation of power issue, a number of authors have shown that 
under certain conditions regular elections can serve as an effective control mechanism 
(Barro 1973, Ferejohn 1986, Adserà et al. 2003).  According to this theory, if the public 
acts retrospectively by basing their votes on the incumbent’s past performance, the fear of 
losing office should keep government officials focused on the public’s interests and 
governance quality should improve (Adserà et al. 2003).   
Another well-known supposition, public choice theory, supports this assertion as 
well.  Known as “the economic study of nonmarket decision-making,” public choice 
theory advances the argument that “man is an egoistic, rational, utility maximizer” 
(Mueller 1976, 395).  In so, government officials will put their own interest before those 
of the public good (Brennan and Buchanan 1985).  Therefore, the type of government 
policies chosen and the extent of public sector expenditures enacted can be traced more 
directly to the government officials’ efforts to win votes rather than what is necessarily in 
the best interest of the population they represent (Wright 1974, Nordhaus 1975, Mueller 
1976).    
Modeling this concept, Persson and Tabellini (2000) show that incumbent 
politicians have an incentive to reduce rent-seeking behavior and focus on promoting 
economic performance, as voters usually reward economic performance with 
reappointment.  According to Sawyer and Sprinkle (2006), “rent-seeking is the act of 
obtaining special treatment by the government at the expense of society as a whole” 
(180).  In this context, rent-seeking is understood as an activity that benefits only a small 
group in society, yet the whole society incurs a cost (Sawyer and Sprinkle 2006).  For 
example, when a government official agrees to raise tariffs on a particular product in 
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exchange for voter support, the domestic industries that produce that product will benefit 
from protection from imports, and the government official will benefit from additional 
voter support in the next election, yet the whole of society will incur higher prices on the 
product due to the higher tariffs (Sawyer and Sprinkle 2006).      
However, the effectiveness of regular elections, that is, elections that occur on a 
consistent schedule, as an accountability control mechanism is not guaranteed and indeed 
may vary based on a number of variables.  According to Adserà et al. (2003), there are 
three main determinants which play the largest role in this dynamic: level of democracy, 
the level of information among the public, and diversity of the economy.  First, due to the 
difficulties of overthrowing an authoritarian regime compared to ousting incumbents 
through elections, rent-seeking behavior should be higher in dictatorships than in 
democracies (Adserà et al. 2003).  As the level of democracy increases, government 
official accountability should increase and rent-seeking should decrease (Adserà et al. 
2003).  Second, the extent of information available to the public regarding government 
officials’ activities corresponds with levels of public corruption and mismanagement.  As 
the level of information available to the public increases, opportunities for rent-seeking 
behavior, or “the act of obtaining special treatment by the government at the expense of 
society as a whole,”(Sawyer and Sprinkle 2006, 180) decrease (Adserà et al. 2003).     
Finally, diversification of the economy should also play a role in accountability. 
According to the “rentier effect,” three main outcomes may occur when economies are 
dependent upon a narrow export base, such as oil, which the government can control and 
extract revenue from easily (Isham et al. 2005, 147).  First, when the government is able 
to obtain revenue easily from a narrow export base, there is less need to tax the citizens, 
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and therefore less need to develop the institutions of government to do so (Isham et al. 
2005).  In addition, with less taxation, the citizens are less concerned about developing 
the systems of government oversite and accountability to help promote institutional 
quality (Isham et al. 2005).  Second, the government is able to use the revenue gained 
from control of the narrow export base to ease dissent by paying off government critics or 
providing extra benefits to keep citizens content (Isham et al. 2005).  Third, the 
government also has additional resources to put into violent repression of government 
critics, reducing pressures for government reform (Isham et al. 2005).  Therefore, in 
countries with a narrow export base government accountability and oversite should be 
lower than in countries with a more diversified export base. 
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CHAPTER III  - METHODOLOGY 
This chapter discusses the methodology incorporated in this study, including the 
research questions, hypotheses, dependent and independent variables, data, descriptive 
and inferential statistics, and the limitations of the methodology.  
 Research Questions 
1. How does level of democracy affect quality of governance? 
2. How does the degree of information available to the public affect quality of 
governance? 
3. How does diversification of the economy affect quality of governance? 
Hypotheses 
H1: Quality of governance has a direct relationship with the level of democracy. 
Due to the difficulties of overthrowing an authoritarian regime compared to 
ousting incumbents through elections, rent-seeking behavior should be higher in 
dictatorships than in democracies (Adserà et al. 2003).  As the level of democracy 
increases, rent-seeking should decrease, government official accountability should 
increase, and in result, quality of governance should also increase (Adserà et al. 2003).   
H2: Quality of governance has a direct relationship with the information available 
to the public.  
As the level of information available to the public increases, opportunities for 
rent-seeking behavior, or “the act of obtaining special treatment by the government at the 
expense of society as a whole” (Sawyer and Sprinkle 2006, 180) should decrease (Adserà 
et al. 2003), and quality of governance should increase.      
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H3: Quality of governance has a direct relationship with the diversification of the 
economy. 
As predicted by the “rentier effect,” quality of governance should improve as an 
economy become more diversified (Isham et al. 2005).  When the government can 
control and extract revenue from few major exports items, there are some basic outcomes 
which can be expected (Isham et al. 2005).  First, with the increased revenue obtained 
from the small export base, the government may tax citizens less, and therefore, the 
government institutions to do so may not develop as a result (Isham et al. 2005).  When 
citizens are taxed less, they may also be less concerned about government oversite and 
accountability (Isham et al. 2005).  Second, with the additional income obtained from 
control of the small number of exports, government officials may have more resources to 
provide extra benefits to keep citizens content and to bribe critics (Isham et al. 2005).  
Third, with low variety of exports, government leaders may also have surplus resources 
to put toward violent repression of opposition (Isham et al. 2005).  Consequently, 
countries that receive revenue from and control a small variation in exports should have 
lower government accountability and oversite than countries that receive revenue from a 
greater diversity of exports.  
Methods 
To examine the factors that contribute to the quality of governance, this study 
utilizes a fixed effects panel analysis.  According to Wooldridge (2009), panel data 
methodology is used when data on the same units (such as states) are gathered over time.  
As Wooldridge (2009) notes, it cannot be assumed that these observations over time are 
independently distributed. To account for any unobserved factors that might be correlated 
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with explanatory variables, it is necessary to perform a procedure to remove these 
unobserved effects (Wooldridge 2009).  The fixed effects transformation is an effective 
approach when the idiosyncratic errors are serially uncorrelated and no assumptions are 
being made about any correlation between the unobserved effect and the explanatory 
variables (Wooldridge 2009).   Through the fixed effects transformation, the panel data 
model is transformed to remove any unobserved, time-constant factors that might affect 
the dependent variable.  In this process, each of the variables in the model is time-
demeaned; meaning, that for each cross-sectional unit, the average of the time period the 
average over time is subtracted from each individual time period (Wooldridge 2009).  Six 
linear regressions are created, each with a separate dimension of the WGI as the 
dependent variable, and level of democracy, level of internet access, and diversification 
of the economy as the independent variables.  The model for each linear regression 
follows the general form below: 
yit = β1x1 + β2x2 + β3x3 + β4x4 + uit                                  Equation 1 
Where y is quality of governance for country i at time t, alternately represented by each 
of the six WGIs, x1 is level of democracy, x2 is level of internet access, and x3 is a 
measurement of the diversification of the economy, and x4 is a set of control variables.   
Dependent Variables 
The WGI Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) produced by the World Bank 
(2015) represents quality of governance.  The WGI reports governance quality indicators 
for 215 countries for the years 1996-2016 along six dimensions: voice and accountability, 
political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regularity quality, 
rule of law, and control of corruption.  For the purposes of this study, data from 143 
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countries for the years 2010 – 2015 are used   Scores for each of the indicators range 
from -2.5 to 2.5 with higher scores representing higher quality of governance.  
Independent Variables 
Level of democracy is represented by data from the Polity IV Project by Marshall 
et al. (2016) which measures level of democracy on a scale of 0-10 for 167 countries 
from 1800-2015 with higher values indicating higher levels of democracy. Level of 
democracy should have a direct impact on the quality of governance dependent variable.  
Due to the difficulties of overthrowing authoritarian regimes compared to removing 
government officials through elections, rent-seeking behavior should be higher and 
quality of governance should be lower in dictatorships than in democracies (Adserà et al. 
2003).  As the level of democracy increases, government official accountability should 
increase, rent-seeking behavior should decrease, and quality of governance should 
improve (Adserà et al. 2003).  Data for 143 countries for the years 2010 – 2015 are 
included.  
Level of information available to the public is represented by data from the 
International Telecommunications Union (2016a) on the percentage of individuals using 
the internet for over 200 countries from 2000 – 2015. For the purposes of this study, data 
from 143 countries for the years 2010 – 2015 are used. The level of information available 
to the public should have a direct impact on the governance quality dependent variable.  
The extent of information available to the public regarding the activities of government 
officials is directly related to levels of public corruption and mismanagement. As the 
level of information available to the public increases, opportunities for rent-seeking 
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behavior by government officials should decrease, and quality of governance should 
improve (Adserà et al. 2003). 
Diversification of the economy is represented by the number of unique 
harmonized system (HS) product codes exported by country available from the World 
Bank (2017).  Data on 143 countries for the years 2010 - 2015 is included.  Due to the 
“rentier effect,” countries that control and receive revenue from a few sources of exports 
should have lower government accountability and oversite than countries that receive 
revenue from a more diversified export base. 
Control Variables 
Level of economic development is included based on the argument that as 
incomes increase, citizens become less focused on day-to-day survival and are 
increasingly able to participate in collective action to place pressure on the State to 
improve governance (Welzel and Inglehart 2008, Charron and Lapuente 2009).  A 
number of studies have tested the relationship between economic development and 
governance and establish a strong correlation between these two variables (La Porta et al. 
1999, Al-Marhubi 2004, Lee and Whitford 2009, Garcia-Sanchez et al. 2013, Adkisson 
and McFerrin 2014, Rontos et al. 2015).  However, a number of authors (La Porta et al. 
1999, Al-Marhubi 2004, Lee and Whitford 2009) call for caution in interpreting the 
impact of economic development on governance due to the apparent mutually-dependent 
relationship between the two variables, which could exhibit a simultaneity bias.  Data 
from the World Bank (2016b) on per capita income is included for the years 2010 – 2015 
for 143 countries.  
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However, it should also be considered that as incomes increase, citizens might be 
satisfied just to enjoy their higher incomes and may become less interested in upsetting 
the status quo.  This is a potential explanation as to how authoritarian rulers maintain 
their power.  As long as conditions in the country remain stable, citizens might indeed be 
less interested in governance reform.  To investigate the possibility that political stability 
matters more in promoting governance quality than income, data from the Fragile States 
Index by the Fund for Peace (2017) is included for the years 2010 – 2015 for 143 
countries.    
Openness to international trade is included to assess the argument that high-
quality domestic institutions should evolve more quickly in open economies (Islam and 
Montenegro 2002, Al-Marhubi 2004).  This is the case because economic agents have an 
incentive to improve their government institutions to manage risk and to help compete 
more effectively with foreign agents (Islam and Montenegro 2002). The exchange of 
information and learning opportunities between agents in open economies should help to 
bring about better institutions as well (Islam and Montenegro 2002).   
South Korea of the 1960s and 1970s may be an exception to this argument.  
During this time, South Korea was ruled by a military dictatorship and the country’s 
leadership was interested in autocratically opening the economy and improving state 
functions.  While domestic institutions did improve as the economy opened, it remained 
under autocratic rule until at least 1986 when the constitution was modified to allow for 
presidential elections (BBC 2017). Therefore, it could be debated as to whether or not the 
country was developing high-quality domestic institutions as the economy opened if the 
country was being ruled by a dictatorship.  Regardless, the theory that institutions should 
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improve as economies open is still a strong argument due to the need to have strong 
institutions in place to manage budding relationships with trade partners. To represent 
economic openness, data is included from the World Bank (2016d) on percent of GDP 
attributed to trade for the years 2010 – 2015 for 143 countries.  
Level of education is included based on the argument that more educated 
populations usually demand a higher level of accountability from government officials, 
which should result in improved governance (Tolbert et al. 2008).  Level of education is 
represented by the education index from the United Nations Human Development 
Programme (2016) which is a combination of the mean years of schooling and expected 
years of schooling by country.  Data for 143 countries are available for the years 2010 – 
2015.  
Total population is included to represent government resources and public 
services.  Larger countries generally have larger public-sector budgets, better-trained 
staff, and more refined bureaucracies (Garcia-Sanchez et al. 2013).  Data on total 
population is taken from the World Bank (2016c) for the years 2010 – 2015 for 143 
countries.  
A measurement representing freedom of the press is included, as a free press 
should help to promote the exchange of information in society and provide the public 
with the information it needs to help hold government officials accountable (Djankov et 
al. 2001).  While indices on freedom of the press are available from both Freedom House 
and Reporters Without Borders, the data for this study is taken from Freedom House 
(2016a) as data for all 143 countries is available for the years 2010 – 2015 with lower 
scores corresponding with greater levels of freedom.  Additionally, Freedom House has 
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used a consistent methodology in its index during this time while Reporters Without 
Borders (2016) has not.  
A measurement of cell phone penetration is included as the governments of many 
countries may restrict access to the internet. To get around this, cell phone 
communications applications are increasingly offering citizens another way to share and 
access information with less governmental oversite (Freedom House 2016b).  Data on 
cell phone penetration is taken from the International Telecommunications Union 
(2016b) for 143 countries for the years 2010 – 2015.  
Limitations of Methodology 
According to Wooldridge (2009), since panel data analysis includes data gathered 
on the same units over time, it can be more difficult to obtain full panel data sets than 
cross-sectional data which is data gathered during just one time period.  In addition, as 
noted by Allison (2009), fixed effects regression cannot be used with time-invariant 
variables.  Finally, while fixed effects regression is effective when no assumptions are 
being made about any correlation between the unobserved effect and the explanatory 
variables, it is not effective when the unobserved effect is assumed to be uncorrelated 
with all explanatory variables (Wooldridge 2009). 
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CHAPTER IV – RESULTS 
To examine the factors which contribute to the quality of governance, this study 
utilizes two different types of statistical analysis.  First, a fixed effects panel analysis is 
conducted where six linear regressions are created, each with a separate dimension of the 
WGI as the dependent variable, and information available to the public and 
diversification of the economy as the independent variables along with seven control 
variables.  The second statistical analysis in this study is OLS cross-sectional regression.  
For the majority of countries included in this study, the measurement of the democracy 
variable reflects very little change during the period of analysis.  Since fixed effects panel 
regression is only effective with time variant variables (Allison 2009), the democracy 
variable is not included in the fixed effects regressions.  Instead, to assess democracy’s 
effect on governance, individual cross-sectional OLS regressions are reported for each of 
the six years in the period of analysis with all independent variables, including 
democracy.  The results of these individual regressions are reported in tables 1.5-1.10 
below.  
Due to restrictions on data availability, 143 countries are included in this study, 
each with at least two years of data available for each of the independent variables during 
the 2010 – 2015 period of analysis. See the appendix for a listing of all countries included 
and excluded.  To account for missing data points under certain independent variables, 
two different approaches are used.  The first technique consists of averaging the two 
recent data points available for each country for each variable missing data, referred to as 
the AMV model here forward.  The second technique consists of regressing the available 
 37 
data against a sequence of years and using the slope and intercept of this regression to 
estimate the missing values, referred to as the RMV model here forward.  Note: the RMV 
results are used in the 2010-2015 cross-sectional regressions for democracy.  The results 
of the two approaches to estimating missing data are included in the tables 1.3 and 1.4 
below.   
The linear regression equation for the fixed effects analysis is as follows: 
yit = β1INF + β2DIV + β3ECO + β4OPE + β5EDU + β6POP + β7FRE + β8CEL  
+ β9FRA + uit                                                                             Equation 2 
Where y is quality of governance for country i at time t, alternately represented by each 
of the six WGIs, INF is level of information available to the public in the form of internet 
access, DIV is a measurement of the diversification of the economy, ECO is level of 
economic development, OPE is economic openness, EDU is level of education, POP is 
population, FRE is freedom of the press, CEL is cellphone penetration, FRA is state 
fragility, and u is the stochastic error term.   
The linear regression equation for the cross-sectional OLS analysis is as follows: 
yi = β0 + β1DEM +β2INF + β3DIV + β4ECO + β5OPE + β6EDU + β7POP + β8FRE + 
β9CEL + β10FRA + ui                                                                                Equation 3 
Where Y is quality of governance for country i, alternately represented by each of the six 
WGIs, DEM is level of democracy, and the other variables are as indicated in the fixed 
effects equation above.  
Expected signs of the regression outputs are as follows: 
                                +            +           +            +            +            +              -            +           -  
Yit = F (INF, DIV, ECO, OPE, EDU, POP, FRE, CEL, FRA)            Equation 4 
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                           +            +           +            +            +            +             +            -            +           -  
Yi = F (DEM, INF, DIV, ECO, OPE, EDU, POP, FRE, CEL, FRA)        Equation 5 
Democracy is expected to have a direct relationship due to the difficulties of 
overthrowing corrupt authoritarian regimes compared to removing poor governments 
through elections.  Information available to the public is expected to have a direct 
relationship because an informed public reduces the opportunities for rent-seeking among 
government officials.  Diversification of the economy is expected to have a direct 
relationship since countries that control and receive revenue from a low number of 
exports have more resources to pay off critics and less need to develop institutions to tax 
citizens.  
For control variables, level of economic development should have a direct 
relationship as citizens in more affluent societies are less focused on day-to-day survival 
and are increasingly able to participate in collective action to place pressure on the State 
to improve governance.  Economic openness is expected to have a direct relationship 
since domestic institutions should evolve more quickly in open economies in order to 
manage risk and to help compete more effectively with foreign agents.  Level of 
education should have a direct relationship as educated populations usually demand a 
higher level of accountability from government officials, resulting in improved 
governance.  Population is expected to have a direct relationship as larger countries 
generally have larger public-sector budgets, better-trained staff, and more refined 
bureaucracies.  Freedom of the press is expected to be inverse as higher values of this 
variable indicate less freedom and a free press should help to promote the exchange of 
information in society and provide the public with the information it needs to help hold 
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government officials accountable.  Cell phone penetration rate should have a direct 
relationship because cell phone applications are increasingly offering citizens another 
way to share and access information with less governmental oversite. Finally, state 
fragility is expected to be negative as higher values of this variable indicate higher 
fragility and quality of governance should decline as political instability increases.  
Descriptive and summary statistics for each of the hypotheses are listed below.  
Table 1  
Descriptive Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variables  
Variable Obs. Mean  Stand. Dev. Min. Max. 
VOI 858 -0.026 0.107 -1.178 0.709 
POL 858 -0.152 0.196 -1.353 1.417 
GOV 858 0.035 0.101 -0.310 0.399 
REG 858 0.072 0.101 -0.310 0.399 
RUL 858 -0.027 0.090 -0.355 0.332 
RULD1 715 0.010 0.071 -0.261 0.240 
COR 858 -0.039 0.104 -0.536 0.338 
CORD1 715 0.003 0.086 -0.348 0.375 
DEM … … … … … 
INF 858 0.041 0.006 0.013 0.060 
DIV 858 2.47 0.247 -0.402 4.345 
ECO 858 1.460 0.205 -0.492 2.348 
OPE 858 0.089 0.008 0.043 0.154 
EDU 858 0.637 0.011 0.582 0.669 
POP 858 0.471 0.027 0.076 0.857 
FRE 858 0.479 0.030 0.361 0.761 
CEL 858 0.104 0.012 0.048 0.154 
FRA 858 0.068 0.001 0.055 0.082 
Due to differences in measurement scales, the independent variables are rescaled as follows to ease interpretation of results: DEM and 
EDU are unchanged, FRE and FRA are per 100 units, INF, DIV, OPE, CEL are per 1,000 units, ECO is per 10,000 units, and POP is 
per 100,000,000 units. 
 
  
4
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Table 2  
Correlation Matrix for all Variables 
 VOI POL GOV REG RULD1 CORD1 INF DIV ECO OPE EDU POP FRE CEL FRA 
VOL 1.0000               
POL 0.6749 1.0000              
GOV 0.7613 0.7253 1.0000             
REG 0.7760 0.6929 0.9384 1.0000            
RULD1 -0.0125 0.0534 0.0068 0.0047 1.0000           
CORD
1 
-0.0544 -0.0173 -0.0348 -0.0504 0.2835 1.0000          
INF 0.5971 0.6001 0.8484 0.8041 -0.0533 -0.0521 1.0000         
DIV 0.5868 0.4293 0.7334 0.7231 -0.0251 -0.0456 0.7011 1.0000        
ECO 0.5694 0.5820 0.7818 0.7358 -0.0270 -0.0782 0.7613 0.4914 1.0000       
OPE 0.1771 0.3944 0.3349 0.3372 0.0190 -0.0057 0.3166 0.1482 0.3467 1.0000      
EDU 0.6264 0.6088 0.7738 0.7430 -0.0087 -0.0189 0.8676 0.7229 0.6251 0.2877 1.0000     
POP -0.0820 -0.1567 0.0029 -0.0590 -0.0185 0.0488 -0.0510 0.2355 -0.0573 -0.2065 -0.0486 1.0000    
FRE -0.9441 -0.6035 -0.6498 -0.6711 0.0238 0.0511 -0.4747 -0.4302 -0.5047 -0.1604 -0.4981 0.0959 1.0000   
CEL 0.2816 0.4142 0.4850 0.4758 -0.0800 -0.0278 0.6196 0.4478 0.3824 0.3484 0.6201 -0.1101 -0.1941 1.0000  
FRA -0.7893 -0.8093 -0.8879 -0.8621 0.0743 0.0833 -0.8491 -0.6794 -0.7796 -0.3454 -0.8208 0.0703 0.6948 -0.5457 1.0000 
Democracy is not included due to the secondary cross-sectional regression analysis of this variable.  
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Diagnostics on Averaged and Regressed Fixed Effects Models 
The following diagnostics are conducted on both the AMV and RMV fixed 
effects models. First, a Fisher-Type Phillips-Peron unit root test is conducted on all 
dependent and independent variables to check for stationarity.  All variables are 
stationary except the Rule of Law and Control of Corruption independent variables.  To 
address this non-stationarity, both variables are first differenced once (Torres-Reyna, 
n.d.).  
Second, the tests below are conducted individually on each of the six AMV and 
each of the six RMV fixed effects models.  The diagnostic results for both models are the 
same and are reported as follows. 
Voice and Accountability. A Pesaran test for cross-sectional independence, a 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation, and a modified Wald test for groupwise 
heteroscedasticity indicate that cross-sectional dependence, autocorrelation, and 
groupwise heteroscedasticity are all present, respectively.  To account for this, Driskoll-
Kraay standard errors are incorporated.  According to Hoechle (2007), Driskoll-Kraay 
standard errors are effective in the presence of cross-sectional independence, 
autocorrelation, and heteroscedasticity.  A Hausman test for fixed or random effects is 
conducted and indicates that a fixed effects approach is appropriate rather than random 
effects.  Finally, a post-estimation test on joint restrictions on the parameters indicates 
that it is necessary to control for time fixed effects. 
Political Stability and the Absence of Violence. A Pesaran test for cross-sectional 
independence indicates that cross-sectional dependence is not present.  However, the 
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Wooldridge test for autocorrelation and the modified Wald test for groupwise 
heteroscedasticity indicates that cross-autocorrelation and groupwise heteroscedasticity 
are both present, respectively.  To account for this, Rogers’ standard errors are used.  
According to Hoechle (2007), Rogers standard errors should be used in the presence of 
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity without cross-sectional dependence.  A Hausman 
test for fixed or random effects is conducted and indicates that a fixed effects approach is 
appropriate rather than random effects.  Finally, a post-estimation test on joint restrictions 
on the parameters indicates that controlling for time fixed effects is not necessary.  
Government Effectiveness. A Pesaran test for cross-sectional independence, a 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation, and a modified Wald test for groupwise 
heteroscedasticity indicate that cross-sectional dependence, autocorrelation, and 
groupwise heteroscedasticity are all present, respectively.  To account for this, Driskoll-
Kraay standard errors are incorporated into this regression.  According to Hoechle 
(2007), Driskoll-Kraay standard errors are effective are effective in the presence of cross-
sectional independence, autocorrelation, and heteroscedasticity.  A Hausman test for 
fixed or random effects is conducted and indicates that a fixed effects approach is 
appropriate rather than random effects.  Finally, a post-estimation test on joint restrictions 
on the parameters indicates that controlling for time fixed effects is necessary.  
Regularity Quality. A Pesaran test for cross-sectional independence, a 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation, and a modified Wald test for groupwise 
heteroscedasticity indicate that cross-sectional dependence, autocorrelation, and 
groupwise heteroscedasticity are all present, respectively.  To account for this, Driskoll-
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Kraay standard errors are incorporated into this regression.  According to Hoechle 
(2007), Driskoll-Kraay standard errors are effective are effective in the presence of cross-
sectional independence, autocorrelation, and heteroscedasticity.  A Hausman test for 
fixed or random effects is conducted and indicates that a fixed effects approach is 
appropriate rather than random effects. Finally, a post-estimation test on joint restrictions 
on the parameters indicates that controlling for time fixed effects is necessary.  
Rule of Law. The Fisher-Type Phillips-Peron unit root test indicates that the rule 
of law variable should be first differenced to address non-stationarity. A Pesaran test for 
cross-sectional independence, a Wooldridge test for autocorrelation, and a modified Wald 
test for groupwise heteroscedasticity indicate that cross-sectional dependence, 
autocorrelation, and groupwise heteroscedasticity are all present, respectively.  To 
account for this, Driskoll-Kraay standard errors are incorporated into this regression.  
According to Hoechle (2007), Driskoll-Kraay standard errors are effective are effective in 
the presence of cross-sectional independence, autocorrelation, and heteroscedasticity.  A 
Hausman test for fixed or random effects is conducted and indicates that a fixed effects 
approach is appropriate rather than random effects.  Finally, a post-estimation test on 
joint restrictions on the parameters indicates that controlling for time fixed effects is 
necessary.  
Control of Corruption. The Fisher-Type Phillips-Peron unit root test indicates that 
the control of corruption variable should be first differenced to address non-stationarity.  
The Pesaran test for cross-sectional independence indicates that there is no cross-
sectional dependence present, and the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation indicates that 
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there is no autocorrelation.  However, the Modified Wald test for groupwise 
heteroscedasticity does indicate heteroscedasticity.  According to Hoechle (2007), 
incorporating White standard errors is preferred when controlling for just 
heteroscedasticity.  Finally, a post-estimation test on joint restrictions on the parameters 
indicates that controlling for time fixed effects is not necessary.  
Table 3  
Fixed Effects Regression with Averaged Missing Values (AMV) 
Indep. Var. VOI POL GOV REG RUL COR 
DEM … … … … … … 
INF -0.126 
(0.450) 
[0.791] 
-4.17 
(3.61) 
[0.249] 
4.877 
(0.588)     
[0.000]*** 
-0.108 
(0.402) 
[0.798] 
-1.191 
(1.129) 
[0.351] 
-1.079 
(0.833) 
[0.198] 
DIV -0.018 
(0.007) 
  [0.064]* 
0.023 
(0.033) 
[0.491] 
0.051 
(0.177)    
[0.033]** 
0.076 
(0.024)    
[0.027]** 
-0.022 
(0.005)    
[0.018]** 
-0.048 
 (0.013)      
[0.000]*** 
ECO 0.032 
(0.011) 
  [0.036]** 
0.095 
(0.027)      
[0.001]*** 
0.027 
(0.012) 
 [0.086]* 
0.075 
(0.018)    
[0.011]** 
0.024 
(0.011) 
[0.109] 
-0.024 
(0.017) 
[0.178] 
OPE -0.903 
(0.250) 
  [0.015]** 
-3.43 
(0.965)       
[0.001]*** 
0.265 
(0.232) 
[0.306] 
0.035 
(0.131) 
[0.801] 
-0.600 
(0.160)    
[0.020]** 
-0.765 
(0.420) 
  [0.071]* 
EDU 0.362 
(0.194) 
[0.122] 
2.144 
(1.287) 
  [0.098]* 
1.832 
(0.325) 
   [0.002]** 
1.251 
(0.142)      
[0.000]*** 
0.460 
(0.338) 
[0.245] 
0.831 
(0.625) 
[0.186] 
POP 0.021 
(0.014) 
[0.196] 
0.267 
(0.216) 
[0.220] 
-0.038 
(0.164) 
[0.823] 
-0.224 
(0.049)    
[0.006]** 
0.133 
(0.035)    
[0.020]** 
0.160 
(0.088) 
  [0.072]* 
FRE -2.47 
[0.155)   
[0.000]*** 
-0.312 
(0.648) 
[0.631] 
-0.222 
(0.107) 
  [0.095]* 
-0.452 
(0.117)    
[0.012]** 
-0.470 
(0.091)     
[0.007]** 
-0.158 
(0.133) 
[0.239] 
CEL 0.072 
(0.194) 
[0.724] 
-0.857 
(1.251) 
[0.494] 
-0.192 
(0.096) 
[0.101] 
1.235 
(0.131)      
[0.000]*** 
-0.783 
(0.125)    
[0.003]** 
0.175 
(0.377) 
[0.642] 
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Table 3 (continued) 
FRA 4.02 
(3.81) 
[0.34] 
-3.108 
(0.847)       
[0.000]*** 
-1.166 
(0.118)      
[0.000]*** 
-1.362 
(0.184)       
[0.001]*** 
0.736 
(0.118)    
[0.003]** 
0.091 
(0.188) 
[0.628] 
_cons 0.684 
(0.225)     
[0.029]** 
1.008 
(0.937) 
[0.284] 
-0.511 
(0.274) 
[0.121] 
0.156 
(0.234) 
[0.534] 
…1 -0.338 
(0.395) 
[0.394] 
Obs. 858 858 858 858 715 715 
Countries 143 143 143 143 143 143 
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 
Within  
R-squared 
0.517 0.138 0.144 0.168 0.212 0.031 
Standard errors are in parenthesis and p-values are in brackets. 
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
1 Constant term omitted due to first differencing of the dependent variable. 
Table 4  
Fixed Effects Regression with Regressed Missing Values (RMV) 
Indep. Var. VOI POL GOV REG RUL COR 
DEM … … … … … … 
INF -0.133 
(0.437) 
[0.773] 
-4.171 
(3.577) 
[0.246] 
4.886 
(0.586)      
[0.000]*** 
-0.157 
(0.416) 
[0.721] 
-1.137 
(1.101) 
[0.360] 
-1.066 
(0.848) 
[0.211] 
DIV -0.014 
(0.007) 
[0.121] 
0.017 
(0.032) 
[0.592] 
0.047 
(0.016)    
[0.034]** 
0.077 
(0.023) 
   [0.021]** 
-0.020 
(0.005) 
[0.025]** 
-0.048 
(0.013)     
[0.000]*** 
ECO 0.030 
(0.011) 
  [0.051]* 
0.105 
(0.032)    
[0.002]** 
0.028 
(0.012) 
  [0.072]* 
0.080 
(0.019)     
[0.009]*** 
0.027 
(0.012) 
[0.091]* 
-0.023 
(0.017) 
[0.191] 
OPE -0.793 
(0.259)    
[0.028]** 
-3.560 
(0.966)      
[0.000]*** 
0.347 
(0.239) 
[0.207] 
0.214 
(0.127) 
[0.153] 
-0.502 
(0.136) 
[0.021]** 
-0.719 
(0.413) 
 [0.084]* 
EDU 0.357 
(0.193) 
[0.124] 
2.152 
(1.290) 
[0.097] 
1.825 
(0.321)     
[0.002]** 
1.248 
(0.142)       
[0.000]*** 
0.453 
(0.345) 
[0.259] 
0.828 
(0.624) 
[0.187] 
POP 0.026 
(0.015) 
[0.139] 
0.258 
(0.219) 
[0.241] 
-0.039 
(0.162) 
[0.820] 
-0.221 
(0.048)      
[0.006]*** 
0.134 
(0.035) 
[0.018]** 
0.162 
(0.088) 
  [0.069]* 
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Table 4 (continued) 
FRE -2.474 
(0.156)      
[0.000]*** 
-0.321 
(0.646) 
[0.620] 
-0.222 
(0.104) 
  [0.087]* 
-0.458 
(0.110)       
[0.009]*** 
-0.469 
(0.091) 
[0.007]** 
-0.164 
(0.133) 
[0.221] 
CEL 0.064 
(0.195) 
[0.755] 
-0.849 
1.241 
[0.495] 
-0.192 
(0.100) 
[0.112] 
1.212 
(0.120)     
[0.000]*** 
-0.796 
(0.122) 
[0.003]** 
0.178 
(0.373) 
[0.633] 
FRA 4.184 
(3.790) 
[0.320] 
-3.082 
(0.812)      
[0.000]*** 
-1.165 
(0.117)      
[0.000]*** 
-1.339 
(0.187)      
[0.001]*** 
0.749 
(0.120) 
[0.003]** 
0.088 
(0.192) 
[0.644] 
_cons 0.660 
(0.218)    
[0.029]** 
1.004 
(0.928) 
[0.281] 
-0.506 
(0.269) 
[0.118] 
0.122 
(0.228) 
[0.615] 
…1 -0.338 
(0.398) 
[0.397] 
Obs. 858 858 858 858 715 715 
Countries 143 143 143 143 143 143 
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.000 
Within  
R-squared 
0.514 0.142 0.143 0.173 0.211 0.031 
Standard errors are in parenthesis and p-values are in brackets 
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
1 Constant term omitted due to first differencing of the dependent variable. 
For both the AMV and RMV models, the reported F-statistics are significant in all 
regressions and the within R-squared values are nearly identical.  There are 143 countries 
included in all models, with 858 observations for voice and accountability, political 
stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, and regularity quality.  Both 
rule of law and control of corruption include 715 observations each due to the first 
differencing of the dependent variables to account for their non-stationarity.   
While there is a slight difference in the within R-squared results between the 
AMV and RMV models, when rounded to the nearest percent they are identical.  The 
within R-squared results indicate that both models explain approximately 51% of the 
variation in voice and accountability, 14% of the variation in political stability and 
absence of violence, 14% of the variation in government effectiveness, 16% of the 
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variation in regularity quality, 21% of the variation in rule of law, and 3% of the variation 
in the control of corruption.  The within R-squared results indicate that other factors 
should be identified and included in the model. The inherent (random) variation in the 
respective dependent variables could be large causing a lower R-squared.  
Diagnostics on Cross-Sectional Regressions 
A test of multicollinearity and the Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity 
indicate that neither multicollinearity nor heteroscedasticity is present in any of the 
models.  
Table 5  
Cross-Section OLS Regression of Voice and Accountability Dependent Variable 
Indep. 
Var. 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
DEM 0.069 
(0.008)   
[0.000]*** 
0.076 
(0.008) 
[0.000]*** 
0.064 
(0.079) 
[0.000]*** 
0.067 
(0.007) 
[0.000]*** 
0.060 
(0.007) 
[0.000]*** 
0.065 
(0.007) 
[0.000]*** 
INF 1.189 
(1.540) 
[0.441] 
2.566 
(1.607) 
[0.113] 
-0.730 
(1.548) 
[0.638] 
-0.764 
(1.450) 
[0.599] 
-2.258 
(1.443) 
[0.120] 
-0.464 
(1.430) 
[0.746] 
DIV 0.078 
(0.017) 
[0.000]*** 
0.076 
(0.018) 
[0.000]*** 
0.082 
(0.018) 
[0.000]*** 
0.081 
(0.017) 
[0.000]*** 
0.080 
(0.016) 
[0.000]*** 
0.071 
(0.017) 
[0.000]*** 
ECO 0.013 
(0.015) 
[0.405] 
0.009 
(0.013) 
[0.511] 
0.024 
(0.013) 
[0.072]* 
0.020 
(0.012) 
[0.011]** 
0.010 
(0.012) 
[0.417] 
0.007 
(0.014) 
[0.595] 
OPE -0.197 
(0.354) 
[0.578] 
0.031 
(0.354) 
[0.930] 
-0.198 
(0.348) 
[0.569] 
-0.189 
(0.337) 
[0.576] 
-0.091 
(0.329) 
[0.782] 
-0.119 
(0.324) 
[0.713] 
EDU -0.112 
(0.187) 
[0.550] 
-0.190 
(0.204) 
[0.353] 
0.053 
(0.204) 
[0.795] 
-0.091 
(0.200) 
[0.647] 
0.184 
(0.203) 
[0.364] 
0.162 
(0.200) 
[0.418] 
POP -0.025 
(0.011) 
[0.019]** 
-0.022 
(0.011) 
[0.045]** 
-0.024 
(0.011) 
[0.031]** 
-0.021 
(0.010) 
[0.045]** 
-0.021 
(0.010) 
[0.036]** 
-0.018 
(0.010) 
[0.073]* 
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Table 5 (continued) 
FRE -2.247 
(0.145) 
[0.000]**
* 
-2.130 
(0.152) 
[0.000]**
* 
-2.252 
(0.153) 
[0.000]**
* 
-2.226 
(0.144) 
[0.000]**
* 
-2.464 
(0.146) 
[0.000]**
* 
-2.516 
(0.148) 
[0.000]**
* 
CEL -1.121 
(0.583) 
[0.057]* 
-1.655 
(0.620) 
[0.009]* 
-0.692 
(0.624) 
[0.269] 
-0.815 
(0.554) 
[0.144] 
-0.383 
(0.561) 
[0.496] 
-0.728 
(0.578) 
[0.210] 
FRA -0.712 
(0.161) 
[0.000]**
* 
-0.718 
(0.183) 
[0.000]**
* 
-0.809 
(0.188) 
[0.000]**
* 
-0.891 
(0.178) 
[0.000]**
* 
-0.658 
(0.181) 
[0.000]**
* 
-0.490 
(0.175) 
[0.006]** 
_cons 1.050 
(0.188) 
[0.000]**
* 
0.989 
(0.205) 
[0.000]**
* 
1.055 
(0.214) 
[0.000]**
* 
1.195 
(0.210) 
[0.000]**
* 
1.095 
(0.217) 
[0.000]**
* 
0.980 
(0.213) 
[0.000]**
* 
Obs. 143 143 143 143 143 143 
Countrie
s 
143 143 143 143 143 143 
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-
squared 
0.967 0.963 0.962 0.965 0.966 0.967 
 
Table 6  
Cross-Section OLS Regression of Political Stability Dependent Variable 
Indep. 
Var. 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
DEM -0.019 
(0.023) 
[0.417] 
0.008 
(0.022) 
[0.696] 
-0.009 
(0.022) 
[0.665] 
0.012 
(0.021) 
[0.554] 
0.027 
(0.023) 
[0.245] 
0.020 
(0.022) 
[0.369] 
INF -7.21 
(4.509) 
[0.112] 
-9.992 
(4.365) 
[0.024]** 
-12.17 
(4.395) 
[0.006]*** 
-7.349 
(4.176) 
[0.081]* 
-5.017 
(4.308) 
[0.246] 
-5.335 
(4.272) 
[0.214] 
DIV -0.114 
(0.050) 
[0.025]** 
-0.087 
(0.050) 
[0.083]* 
-0.042 
(0.052) 
[0.418] 
-0.096 
(0.050) 
[0.059]* 
-0.134 
(0.048) 
[0.007]** 
-0.101 
(0.050) 
[0.048]** 
ECO -0.069 
(0.044) 
[0.125] 
-0.025 
(0.037) 
[0.500] 
-0.017 
(0.038) 
[0.648] 
-0.036 
(0.037) 
[0.328] 
-0.044 
(0.038) 
[0.246] 
-0.088 
(0.043) 
[0.042]** 
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Table 6 (continued) 
OPE 2.866 
(1.035) 
[0.006]** 
2.781 
(0.963) 
[0.005]** 
2.520 
(0.987) 
[0.012]** 
2.505 
(0.972) 
[0.011]** 
2.562 
(0.982) 
[0.010]** 
2.555 
(0.968) 
[0.009]** 
EDU 0.564 
(0.548) 
[0.305] 
0.449 
(0.556) 
[0.421] 
0.674 
(0.580) 
[0.248] 
0.146 
(0.576) 
[0.800] 
-0.045 
(0.605) 
[0.940] 
-0.590 
(0.597) 
[0.325] 
POP -0.017 
(0.031) 
[0.571] 
-0.027 
(0.030) 
[0.377] 
-0.034 
(0.031) 
[0.270] 
-0.019 
(0.030) 
[0.518] 
-0.004 
(0.030) 
[0.889] 
-0.013 
(0.030) 
[0.649] 
FRE -0.429 
(0.425) 
[0.315] 
-0.101 
(0.413) 
[0.806] 
-0.153 
(0.435) 
[0.726] 
0.111 
(0.416) 
[0.790] 
0.195 
(0.437) 
[0.656] 
0.277 
(0.444) 
[0.534] 
CEL -0.646 
(1.706) 
[0.705] 
-1.366 
(1.684) 
[0.419] 
-1.149 
(1.770) 
[0.517] 
-0.278 
(1.596) 
[0.862] 
0.015 
(1.676) 
[0.993] 
-0.286 
(1.727) 
[0.868] 
FRA -4.332 
(0.470) 
[0.000]**
* 
-4.435 
(0.497) 
[0.000]**
* 
-4.460 
(0.534) 
[0.000]**
* 
-4.422 
(0.514) 
[0.000]**
* 
-4.357 
(0.542) 
[0.000]**
* 
-4.772 
(0.525) 
[0.000]**
* 
_cons 3.254 
(0.549) 
[0.000]**
* 
3.127 
(0.559) 
[0.000]**
* 
3.126 
(0.607) 
[0.000]**
* 
3.049 
(0.606) 
[0.000]**
* 
2.997 
(0.648) 
[0.000]**
* 
3.660 
(0.637) 
[0.000]**
* 
Obs. 143 143 143 143 143 143 
Countrie
s 
143 143 143 143 143 143 
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-
squared 
0.728 0.734 0.715 0.730 0.711 0.713 
 
Table 7  
Cross-Section OLS Regression of Government Effectiveness Dependent Variable 
Indep. 
Var. 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
DEM -0.019 
(0.017) 
[0.270] 
0.000 
(0.016) 
[0.989] 
-0.008 
(0.015) 
[0.597] 
0.002 
(0.015) 
[0.861] 
-0.026 
(0.015) 
[0.091]* 
-0.030 
(0.014) 
[0.038]** 
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Table 7 (continued) 
INF 12.662 
(3.310) 
[0.000]**
* 
14.338 
(3.353) 
[0.000]**
* 
9.401 
(3.079) 
[0.003]** 
10.259 
(2.963) 
[0.001]** 
8.988 
(2.946) 
[0.003]** 
9.617 
(2.758) 
[0.001]** 
DIV 0.115 
(0.037) 
[0.002]** 
0.102 
(0.038) 
[0.009]** 
0.150 
(0.036) 
[0.000]**
* 
0.143 
(0.035) 
[0.000]**
* 
0.168 
(0.033) 
[0.000]**
* 
0.180 
(0.032) 
[0.000]**
* 
ECO 0.063 
(0.032) 
[0.055]* 
0.060 
(0.028) 
[0.037]** 
0.079 
(0.027) 
[0.004]** 
0.073 
(0.026) 
[0.006]** 
0.065 
(0.026) 
[0.013]** 
0.083 
(0.028) 
[0.003]** 
OPE 1.215 
(0.760) 
[0.112] 
1.274 
(0.740) 
[0.088]* 
1.104 
(0.691) 
[0.113] 
0.848 
(0.690) 
[0.221] 
0.881 
(0.672) 
[0.192] 
0.590 
(0.625) 
[0.347] 
EDU -0.328 
(0.402) 
[0.416] 
-0.470 
(0.427) 
[0.273] 
-0.374 
(0.406) 
[0.358] 
-0.488 
(0.408) 
[0.234] 
-0.121 
(0.414) 
[0.770] 
-0.418 
(0.385) 
[0.280] 
POP 0.020 
(0.023) 
[0.374] 
0.019 
(0.023) 
[0.402] 
-0.000 
(0.022) 
[0.995] 
0.001 
(0.021) 
[0.956] 
0.004 
(0.020) 
[0.816] 
0.018 
(0.019) 
[0.340] 
FRE -0.871 
(0.312) 
[0.006]** 
-0.765 
(0.317) 
[0.017]** 
-0.870 
(0.304) 
[0.005]** 
-0.740 
(0.295) 
[0.014]** 
-0.816 
(0.299) 
[0.007]** 
-1.057 
(0.286) 
[0.000]**
* 
CEL -0.084 
(1.252) 
[0.947] 
-1.165 
(1.294) 
[0.370] 
-0.818 
(1.240) 
[0.510] 
-1.025 
(1.132) 
[0.368] 
-0.913 
(1.146) 
[0.427] 
0.171 
(1.115) 
[0.878] 
FRA -1.188 
(0.345) 
[0.001]** 
-1.076 
(0.382) 
[0.006]** 
-1.244 
(0.374) 
[0.001]** 
-1.253 
(0.365) 
[0.001]** 
-1.351 
(0.370) 
[0.000]**
* 
-1.168 
(0.339) 
[0.001]** 
_cons 0.687 
(0.403) 
[0.091] 
0.548 
(0.429) 
[0.204] 
0.701 
(0.425) 
[0.102] 
0.662 
(0.430) 
[0.126] 
0.702 
(0.443) 
[0.116] 
0.705 
(0.411) 
[0.089]* 
Obs. 143 143 143 143 143 143 
Countrie
s 
143 143 143 143 143 143 
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-
squared 
0.860 0.851 0.865 0.868 0.874 0.882 
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Table 8  
Cross-Section OLS Regression of Regularity Quality Dependent Variable  
Indep. 
Var. 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
DEM 0.009 
(0.018) 
[0.585] 
0.028 
(0.016) 
[0.090]* 
0.024 
(0.016) 
[0.145] 
0.016 
(0.016) 
[0.313] 
-0.000 
(0.019) 
[0.975] 
-0.000 
(0.017) 
[0.968] 
INF 10.823 
(3.456) 
[0.002]** 
12.904 
(3.359) 
[0.000]*** 
8.010 
(3.283) 
[0.016]** 
8.115 
(3.191) 
[0.012]** 
8.437 
(3.540) 
[0.019]** 
6.720 
(3.345) 
[0.047]** 
DIV 0.157 
(0.038) 
[0.000]*** 
0.152 
(0.038) 
[0.000]*** 
0.179 
(0.039) 
[0.000]*** 
0.185 
(0.038) 
[0.000]*** 
0.192 
(0.040) 
[0.000]*** 
0.212 
(0.039) 
[0.024]** 
ECO 0.036 
(0.034) 
[0.296] 
0.049 
(0.028) 
[0.089]* 
0.066 
(0.028) 
[0.022]** 
0.062 
(0.028) 
[0.031]** 
0.052 
(0.031) 
[0.099]* 
0.077 
(0.033) 
[0.024]** 
OPE 1.005 
(0.793) 
[0.207] 
1.020 
(0.742) 
[0.171] 
1.183 
(0.737) 
[0.111] 
1.174 
(0.7430 
[0.116] 
1.574 
(0.807) 
[0.053]* 
1.044 
(0.758) 
[0.171] 
EDU -0.470 
(0.420) 
[0.265] 
-0.694 
(0.428) 
[0.107] 
-0.820 
(0.433) 
[0.061]* 
-0.789 
(0.440) 
[0.075]* 
-0.519 
(0.497) 
[0.299] 
-0.671 
(0.467) 
[0.154] 
POP -0.026 
(0.024) 
[0.265] 
-0.025 
(0.023) 
[0.281] 
-0.037 
(0.023) 
[0.112] 
-0.038 
(0.023) 
[0.100] 
-0.037 
(0.024) 
[0.140] 
-0.039 
(0.023) 
[0.098]* 
FRE -0.780 
(0.326) 
[0.018]** 
-0.603 
(0.318) 
[0.060]* 
-0.593 
(0.325) 
[0.070]* 
-0.732 
(0.318) 
[0.100] 
-0.896 
(0.359) 
[0.014]** 
-0.874 
(0.347) 
[0.013]** 
CEL 1.347 
(1.307) 
[0.305] 
0.559 
(1.296) 
[0.667] 
0.595 
(1.322) 
[0.653] 
-0.376 
(1.220) 
[0.758] 
-0.980 
(1.377) 
[0.478] 
0.429 
(1.352) 
[0.751] 
FRA -0.871 
(0.360) 
[0.017]** 
-0.709 
(0.383) 
[0.066]* 
-1.104 
(0.453) 
[0.302] 
-1.108 
(0.393) 
[0.006]** 
-1.103 
(0.445) 
[0.015]** 
-1.120 
(0.411) 
[0.007]** 
_cons 0.285 
(0.420) 
[0.499] 
0.047 
(0.430) 
[0.911] 
0.470 
(0.453) 
[0.302] 
0.631 
(0.463) 
[0.175] 
0.637 
(0.533) 
[0.234] 
0.603 
(0.499) 
[0.229] 
Obs. 143 143 143 143 143 143 
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Table 8 (continued) 
Countries 143 143 143 143 143 143 
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.833 0.838 0.831 0.833 0.812 0.829 
 
Table 9  
Cross-Section OLS Regression of Rule of Law Dependent Variable 
Indep. 
Var. 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
DEM -0.029 
(0.016) 
[0.082]* 
-0.013 
(0.015) 
[0.402] 
-0.024 
(0.015) 
[0.118] 
-0.022 
(0.016) 
[0.169] 
-0.030 
(0.017) 
[0.084]* 
-0.032 
(0.016) 
[0.058]* 
INF 8.458 
3.202 
[0.009]** 
8.361 
(3.169) 
[0.009]** 
4.029 
(3.089) 
[0.194] 
4.726 
3.091 
[0.129] 
5.512 
(3.237) 
[0.091]* 
5.642 
(3.182) 
[0.079]* 
DIV 0.092 
(0.035) 
[0.011]** 
0.092 
(0.036) 
[0.012]** 
0.116 
(0.036) 
[0.002]** 
0.107 
(0.037) 
[0.005]** 
0.124 
(0.036) 
[0.001]** 
0.133 
(0.037) 
[0.001]** 
ECO 0.069 
(0.031) 
[0.031]** 
0.068 
(0.027) 
[0.013]** 
0.097 
(0.027) 
[0.000]*** 
0.093 
(0.027) 
[0.001]** 
0.098 
(0.028) 
[0.001]** 
0.115 
(0.032) 
[0.000]*** 
OPE 0.733 
(0.735) 
[0.321] 
0.849 
(0.699) 
[0.227] 
0.581 
(0.693) 
[0.404] 
0.470 
(0.720) 
[0.515] 
0.605 
(0.738) 
[0.414] 
0.172 
(0.721) 
[0.812] 
EDU -0.521 
(0.389) 
[0.183] 
-0.690 
(0.404) 
[0.090]* 
-0.511 
(0.407) 
[0.212] 
-0.610 
(0.426) 
[0.155] 
-0.610 
(0.455) 
[0.182] 
-0.860 
(0.4450 
[0.055]* 
POP 0.004 
(0.022) 
[0.855] 
-0.000 
(0.022) 
[0.997] 
-0.010 
(0.022) 
[0.652] 
-0.004 
(0.022) 
[0.831] 
-0.006 
(0.022) 
[0.766] 
-0.006 
(0.022) 
[0.780] 
FRE -1.108 
(0.302) 
[0.000]*** 
-1.012 
(0.300) 
[0.001]** 
-1.188 
(0.305) 
[0.000]*** 
-1.182 
(0.308) 
[0.000]*** 
-1.423 
(0.329) 
[0.000]*** 
-1.499 
(0.330) 
[0.000]*** 
CEL -1.642 
(1.211) 
[0.178] 
-1.848 
(1.223) 
[0.133] 
-1.264 
(1.243) 
[0.311] 
-1.355 
(1.182) 
[0.254] 
-1.307 
(1.260) 
[0.301] 
-0.107 
(1.286) 
[0.934] 
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Table 9 (continued) 
FRA -2.025 
(0.333) 
[0.000]**
* 
-2.036 
(0.361) 
[0.000]**
* 
-2.026 
(0.375) 
[0.000]**
* 
-1.964 
(0.381) 
[0.000]**
* 
-1.423 
(0.329) 
[0.000]**
* 
-1.604 
(0.391) 
[0.000]**
* 
_cons 1.874 
(0.389) 
[0.000]**
* 
1.819 
(0.406) 
[0.000]**
* 
1.873 
(0.426) 
[0.000]**
* 
1.887 
(0.449) 
[0.000]**
* 
1.834 
(0.487) 
[0.000]**
* 
1.816 
(0.474) 
[0.000]**
* 
Obs. 143 143 143 143 143 143 
Countrie
s 
143 143 143 143 143 143 
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-
squared 
0.872 0.870 0.856 0.859 0.853 0.854 
 
Table 10  
Cross-Section OLS Regression of Control of Corruption Dependent Variable  
Indep. 
Var. 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
DEM -0.022 
(0.019) 
[0.246] 
-0.013 
(0.018) 
[0.481] 
-0.022 
(0.019) 
[0.243] 
-0.018 
(0.019) 
[0.342] 
-0.028 
(0.021) 
[0.183] 
-0.031 
(0.019) 
[0.107] 
INF 6.120 
(3.703) 
[0.101] 
5.568 
(3.661) 
[0.131] 
2.573 
(3.826) 
[0.502] 
4.170 
(3.765) 
[0.270] 
4.396 
(4.024) 
[0.277] 
5.319 
(3.682) 
[0.151] 
DIV 0.053 
(0.041) 
[0.199] 
0.060 
(0.042) 
[0.152] 
0.081 
(0.045) 
[0.077]* 
0.062 
(0.045) 
[0.173] 
0.052 
(0.045) 
[0.255] 
0.056 
(0.043) 
[0.200] 
ECO 0.136 
(0.036) 
[0.000]*** 
0.120 
(0.031) 
[0.000]*** 
0.152 
(0.033) 
[0.000]*** 
0.144 
(0.033) 
[0.000]*** 
0.135 
(0.035) 
[0.000]*** 
0.162 
(0.037) 
[0.000]*** 
OPE 1.015 
(0.850) 
[0.235] 
0.928 
(0.808) 
[0.253] 
0.544 
(0.859) 
[0.528] 
0.467 
(0.876) 
[0.595] 
0.545 
(0.918) 
[0.553] 
-0.083 
(0.835) 
[0.920] 
EDU -0.500 
(0.450) 
[0.269] 
-0.631 
(0.4660 
[0.179] 
-0.332 
(0.505) 
[0.511] 
-0.637 
(0.519) 
[0.222] 
-0.635 
(0.566) 
[0.263] 
-1.073 
(0.514) 
[0.039]** 
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Table 10 (continued) 
POP -0.017 
(0.025) 
[0.511] 
-0.019 
(0.025) 
[0.444] 
-0.019 
(0.027) 
[0.469] 
-0.011 
(0.027) 
[0.663] 
-0.005 
(0.028) 
[0.857] 
0.000 
(0.025) 
[0.977] 
FRE -1.001 
(0.349) 
[0.005]*
* 
-0.929 
(0.347) 
[0.008]** 
-1.047 
(0.378) 
[0.007]** 
-1.016 
(0.376) 
[0.008]** 
-1.296 
(0.409) 
[0.002]** 
-1.444 
(0.382) 
[0.000]**
* 
CEL -3.147 
(1.401) 
[0.026]*
* 
-3.450 
(1.412) 
[0.016]** 
-2.507 
(1.541) 
[0.106] 
-2.092 
(1.439) 
[0.148] 
-1.016 
(1.566) 
[0.517] 
0.387 
(1.488) 
[0.795] 
FRA -2.111 
(0.385) 
[0.000]*
** 
-2.219 
(0.417) 
[0.000]**
* 
-2.015 
(0.465) 
[0.000]**
* 
-1.962 
(0.464) 
[0.000]**
* 
-1.825 
(0.506) 
[0.000]**
* 
-1.779 
(0.452) 
[0.000]**
* 
_cons 2.039 
(0.450) 
[0.000]*
** 
2.132 
(0.469) 
[0.000]**
* 
1.878 
(0.528) 
[0.001]** 
1.946 
(0.547) 
[0.001]** 
1.957 
(0.605) 
[0.002]** 
2.119 
(0.549) 
[0.000]**
* 
Obs. 143 143 143 143 143 143 
Countries 143 143 143 143 143 143 
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.838 0.836 0.811 0.806 0.783 0.812 
 
Table 11  
Effect on Dependent Variable by Increasing Independent Variable One SD 
Indep.  
Var. 
VOI POL GOV REG RUL COR 
DEM 2.282*** 0.130 -0.487**1 0.469*2 -1.283*3 -0.932 
INF -0.007 -0.128 0.290*** -0.009 -0.096 -0.074 
DIV -0.032 0.021 0.115** 0.188** -0.070** -0.138*** 
ECO 0.057* 0.110** 0.057* 0.162*** 0.078* -0.055 
OPE -0.059** -0.145*** 0.027 0.017 -0.057** -0.067* 
EDU 0.037 0.121 0.199** 0.136** 0.070 0.106 
POP 0.007 0.036 -0.010 -0.059*** 0.051** 0.051* 
FRE -0.694*** -0.049 -0.066* -0.136*** -0.198** -0.057 
CEL 0.007 -0.052 -0.023 0.144*** -0.135** 0.025 
FRA 0.039 -0.016*** -0.012*** -0.013*** 0.011** 0.001 
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*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
1Only significant in years 2014 and 2015 at a 0.01 and 0.05 p-value, respectively 
2Only significant in 2011 at a 0.10 p-value  
3Only significant in years 2010, 2014 and 2015 all at a 0.01 p-value 
Hypotheses 
The hypotheses are listed below for reference and analyses.  
H1: Quality of governance has a direct relationship with the level of democracy. 
Based on the results in tables 5-10 above, level of democracy has a statistically 
significant relationship with four of the six indicators of government quality.  
Democracy’s most significant relationship is with the voice and accountability WGI. In 
all years of the cross-sectional analysis, 2010 – 2015, democracy is significant at the 
0.001 p-value, and as expected, the sign of the slope is positive.  As noted in table 11, a 
one standard deviation increase in level of democracy results in an increase of 2.282 
standard deviations in voice and accountability.   
While not as significant, level of democracy also has a significant relationship 
with government effectiveness, regularity quality, and rule of law.  For government 
effectiveness, level of democracy is significant at a 0.10 p-value in 2014 and at a 0.05 p-
value in 2015. Democracy is expected to have a direct relationship with each of these 
WGIs.  While the sign of the slope is positive regarding regularity quality, it is negative 
on government effectiveness and rule of law.  As noted in table 11, a one standard 
deviation increase in level of democracy results in a decrease of 0.487 standard 
deviations in government effectiveness. The regressions for years 2010 – 2013 are not 
significant.  For regularity quality, level of democracy is significant at the 0.10 p-value 
for just one year, 2011. No other years during the period of analysis are significant.  As 
 56 
 
noted in table 11, a one standard deviation increase in level of democracy results in an 
increase of 0.469 standard deviations of regularity quality.  Finally, for rule of law, level 
of democracy is significant at the 0.10 p-value for the years 2010, 2014 and 2015 and not 
significant in years 2011 – 2013.  As noted in table 11, a one standard deviation increase 
in level of democracy results in a decrease of 1.283 standard deviations in rule of law.  
H2: Quality of governance has a direct relationship with the information available to the 
public.  
As shown in tables 3 and 4, information available to the public has a statistically 
significant relationship with just one WGI, government effectiveness.  In both AMV and 
RMV models, information available to the public is significant with government 
effectiveness at a 0.001 p-value.  The expected slope of information to the public is 
positive and the results do show a direct relationship with government effectiveness.  As 
indicated in table 11, a one standard deviation increase in information available to the 
public results in an increase of 0.290 standard deviations of government effectiveness.  
Information available to the public does not appear to have a significant relationship with 
any of the other WGI variables.  
H3: Quality of governance has a direct relationship with the diversification of the 
economy. 
 As shown in tables 3 and 4, diversification of the economy has a statistically 
significant relationship with five of the six WGIs.  Political stability and absence of 
violence is the only WGI that is not significant with diversification of the economy.  
Political stability and violence is statistically significant with voice and accountability 
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(only in the AMV model), government effectiveness, regularity quality, rule of law and 
control of corruption at 0.10, 0.05, 0.05 0.05 and 0.01 p-values, respectively.  
Diversification of the economy is expected to have a positive slope with all WGIs, and it 
does indeed have a direct relationship with government effectiveness and regularity 
quality, yet it appears to have a negative effect on rule of law and control of corruption.  
As indicated in table 11, a one standard deviation increase in diversification of the 
economy results in a decrease of 0.032 standard deviations of voice and accountability, 
an increase 0.115 standard deviations of government effectiveness, an increase of 0.188 
standard deviations of regularity quality, a decrease of 0.070 standard deviations of rule 
of law, and a decrease of 0.138 standard deviations of control of corruption.           
Control Variables 
In addition to the three test variables, this study also examines the relationship 
between the six WGIs and seven control variables: economic development, economic 
openness, education, population, freedom of the press, cellphone penetration, and state 
fragility.  The results for these control variables are shown in tables 3 and 4. 
Economic development is statistically significant with four of the six WGIs in the 
AMV model and five of the six WGIs in the RMV model.  For the AVM model, 
economic development is significant with voice and accountability, political stability and 
the absence of violence, government effectiveness, and regularity quality at 0.05, 0.01, 
0.10, and 0.05 p-values, respectively.  For the RMV model, economic development is 
significant with voice and accountability, political stability and the absence of violence, 
government effectiveness, regularity quality, and rule of law at 0.01, 0.05, 0.10, 0.05, and 
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0.10 p-values, respectively.  Economic development has the expected direct relationship 
with all five WGIs.  As indicated in table 11, a one standard deviation increase in 
economic development results in an increase of 0.057 standard deviations in voice and 
accountability, an increase 0.110 standard deviations of political stability and absence of 
violence, an increase of 0.057 standard deviations of government effectiveness, an 
increase of 0.162 standard deviations of regularity quality, and an increase of 0.078 
standard deviations of rule of law.  
Economic openness is statistically significant in both the AMV and RMV models 
with voice and accountability, political stability and the absence of violence, rule of law, 
and control of corruption at 0.05, 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 p-values respectively.  Economic 
openness is expected to have a direct relationship with all variables, yet the regressions 
indicate an inverse relationship.  As indicated in table 11, a one standard deviation 
increase in economic openness results in a decrease of 0.059 standard deviations in voice 
and accountability, a decrease of 0.145 standard deviations of political stability and 
absence of violence, a decrease of 0.057 standard deviations of rule of law, and a 
decrease of 0.067 standard deviations of control of corruption.   
Education is statistically significant in the AMV model with political stability and 
absence of violence at a 0.10 p-value, and with government effectiveness and regularity 
quality in both the AMV and RMV models at a 0.05 and 0.01 p-value respectively.  
Education is expected to have a direct relationship with all variables and does indeed with 
all three WGIs.  As indicated in table 11, a one standard deviation increase in education 
results in an increase of 0.121 standard deviations in political stability and absence of 
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violence, an increase of 0.199 standard deviations in government effectiveness, and an 
increase of 0.136 standard deviations of regularity quality.  
Population is statistically significant in both the AMV and RMV models with 
regularity quality, rule of law, and control of corruption at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 p-
values respectively.  The slope of this variable is expected to be positive, and is positive 
with rule of law and control of corruption, but is negative on regularity quality.  As 
indicated in table 11, a one standard deviation increase in population results in a decrease 
of 0.059 standard deviations in regularity quality, an increase of 0.051 standard 
deviations in rule of law, and an increase of 0.051 standard deviations in control of 
corruption.  
 Freedom of the press is statistically significant in both the AMV and RMV 
models with voice and accountability, government effectiveness, regularity quality, and 
rule of law at 0.01, 0.10, 0.01 (0.05 for the AVM model), and 0.05 p-values respectively.  
As lower values of the FRE variable indicate increased freedom of the press, the slope of 
this variable is expected to be negative and is indeed negative in all models. Table 11 
shows that a one standard deviation decrease in freedom of the press results in an 
increase of 0.694 standard deviations in voice and accountability, 0.066 standard 
deviations of government effectiveness, 0.136 standard deviations of regularity quality, 
and 0.198 standard deviations of rule of law.  
 Cellphone penetration is statistically significant in both the AMV and RMV 
models with just two WGIs, regularity quality and rule of law, at 0.01 and 0.05 p-values 
respectively.  As expected, the slope on regularity quality is positive, but is negative on 
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rule of law, which was not expected.  Shown in table 11, an increase of one standard 
deviation in cellphone penetration results in an increase of 0.144 standard deviations in 
regularity quality and a decrease of 0.135 standard deviations in rule of law.   
 Finally, state fragility is statistically significant in both the AMV and RMV 
models with four of the six WGIs: political stability and the absence of violence, 
government effectiveness, regularity quality, and rule of law, each at the 0.01 p-value 
except rule of law which is significant at 0.05.  As expected, the slope is negative with 
political stability and the absence of violence, government effectiveness, regularity 
quality.  A one standard deviation increase in state fragility results in a decrease in 0.016 
standard deviations in political stability and the absence of violence, a decrease in 0.012 
standard deviations in government effectiveness, and a decrease of 0.013 standard 
deviations in regularity quality.  However, the relationship with rule of law is the 
opposite of expected.  A one standard deviation increase in state fragility results in an 
increase of 0.011 standard deviations in rule of law.    
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CHAPTER V – CONCLUSIONS 
This research examines why some countries exhibit better governance than others 
and identifies which variables play the greatest role in determining governance quality.  
While there appears to be a consensus in the literature that level of economic 
development plays a significant role in determining governance quality (La Porta et al. 
1999, Islam and Montenegro 2002, Adserà et al. 2003, Al-Marhubi 2004, Lee and 
Whitford 2009, Garcia-Sanchez et al. 2013, Adkisson and McFerrin 2014, Rontos et al. 
2015), the role of other variables has not clearly been identified.  This research 
contributes to the discussion by examining the theory that quality of governance is 
largely dependent upon political accountability, defined as the public’s ability to hold 
government officials accountable (Adserà et al. 2003), and that the effect of political 
accountability on governance varies based on three main determinants: level of 
democracy, level of information available to the public, and diversification of the 
economy (Adserà et al. 2003).  As political accountability increases, governance quality 
should improve (Barro 1973, Ferejohn 1986, Adserà et al. 2003).  With quality of 
governance as the dependent variable, this study considers how these three independent 
variables, plus seven control variables, affect governance quality.  
The results of this study demonstrate that level of democracy, level of information 
available to the public, and diversification of the economy do indeed affect governance 
quality; however, it depends upon which aspects of governance are being considered.  
For the purposes of this research, governance is defined as the capacity of a government 
to design, formulate, and implement policies (World Bank 1994, 14), and is represented 
by the World Bank’s (2015) six Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI): voice and 
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accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, 
regularity quality, rule of law, and control of corruption.   
While level of democracy has a significant and direct relationship with a 
country’s voice and accountability and regularity quality, it doesn’t appear to have a 
significant relationship with political stability and absence of violence, or control of 
corruption.  Opposite of what is expected, level of democracy appears to have a 
significant and inverse relationship with government effectiveness and rule of law.  The 
only significant relationship that level of information available to the public has with any 
of the WGIs, is with government effectiveness.  Finally, diversification of the economy 
shows a significant and direct relationship with government effectiveness and regularity 
quality, but not with voice and accountability or political stability and absence of 
violence.  Surprisingly, diversification of the economy appears to have a significant and 
inverse relationship with rule of law and control of corruption.   
Research Questions and Hypotheses    
Research Question #1 
How does level of democracy affect quality of governance? 
H1: Quality of governance has a direct relationship with the level of democracy. 
Due to the difficulties of overthrowing an authoritarian regime compared to 
ousting incumbents through elections, rent-seeking behavior is expected to be higher in 
dictatorships than in democracies (Adserà et al. 2003).  As the level of democracy 
increases, rent-seeking should decrease, government official accountability should 
increase, and in result, quality of governance is expected to increase (Adserà et al. 2003).   
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The results of this study indicate that level of democracy does appear to have a 
significant and direct relationship with voice and accountability and regularity quality.  
This outcome is in line with the theoretical expectations of this study.  Higher levels of 
democracy should result in greater accountability of government officials, less rent-
seeking activity, and improved governance.  Unexpectedly, democracy doesn’t appear to 
have a significant relationship with political stability and absence of violence, or control 
of corruption, and has an inverse relationship with government effectiveness and rule of 
law.  
Research Question #2 
How does the degree of information available to the public affect quality of governance? 
H2: Quality of governance has a direct relationship with the information available to 
the public.  
As the level of information available to the public increases, opportunities for 
rent-seeking behavior, or “the act of obtaining special treatment by the government at the 
expense of society as a whole,” (Sawyer and Sprinkle 2006, 180) should decrease 
(Adserà et al. 2003), and quality of governance should increase.      
The results of this study show that the level of information available to the public 
does appear to play a role in governance quality, but in just one regard, government 
effectiveness.  As information available to the public increases, in the form of internet 
access, the effectiveness of government is shown to improve.  While information 
available to the public was anticipated to affect a broader segment of the WGIs, it could 
also be argued that the government effectiveness indicator, which represents a country’s 
public services, civil services, and policy formation and implementation, is the WGI 
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which most accurately matches this study’s definition of governance quality, and is, 
therefore, the dependent variable which is most relevant to the model.        
Research Question #3 
How does diversification of the economy affect quality of governance? 
H3: Quality of governance has a direct relationship with the diversification of the 
economy. 
As anticipated by the “rentier effect,” quality of governance should improve as 
economies become more diversified (Isham et al. 2005).  When countries have few major 
export items, usually primary products like oil or coal, the government can control and 
extract revenue from these exports easily.  Consequently, a number of outcomes can 
occur (Isham et al. 2005).  With the additional revenue obtained from the small export 
base, the government has less need to tax citizens and therefore less need to develop the 
institutions of government to do so (Isham et al. 2005).  In result, with less taxation, 
citizens are less concerned about government oversite and accountability (Isham et al. 
2005).  Additionally, with the revenue obtained from the few exports, government 
officials have more income to pay off critics and to put down opposition, and to provide 
extra benefits to keep citizens content (Isham et al. 2005).  Therefore, when countries 
have a lower diversity of exports, they should also have less government accountability 
and oversite than countries with a greater diversity of exports.  
The results of this study show that diversification of the economy has a significant 
and direct relationship with two aspects of governance quality: government effectiveness 
and regularity quality.  An increasingly diversified export base is associated with 
improved government effectiveness and regularity quality.  This outcome supports the 
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theoretical expectations of the study.  However, diversification of the economy does not 
appear to have a statistical relationship with voice and accountability or political stability 
and absence of violence.  Furthermore, unexpectedly, diversification of the economy 
appears to have a significant and inverse relationship with rule of law and control of 
corruption.  This indicates that as countries diversify their exports, they may have a more 
difficult time maintaining rule of law and control of corruption.   
Control Variables 
Level of economic development is included in this study because as incomes 
increase, citizens should become less focused on day-to-day survival and should 
increasingly be able to participate in collective action to place pressure on the State to 
improve governance (Welzel and Inglehart 2008, Charron and Lapuente 2009).  As many 
other studies have found (La Porta et al. 1999, Al-Marhubi 2004, Lee and Whitford 2009, 
Garcia-Sanchez et al. 2013, Adkisson and McFerrin 2014, Rontos et al. 2015), the results 
of this study also appear to show that there is indeed a relationship between the level of a 
country’s economic development and its quality of governance.  Level of economic 
development displays a significant and direct relationship with five of the six WGIs.  
Control of corruption is the only WGI that is not significantly related to economic 
development.  However, as some have pointed out (La Porta et al. 1999, Al-Marhubi 
2004, Lee and Whitford 2009), there may be a mutually-dependent relationship between 
these two variables, so caution should be used in interpreting these results.  While 
economic development may increase quality of governance, quality of governance may 
also increase level of economic development.  
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While economic development does appear to promote quality of governance, 
there is also a possibility that as incomes increase, citizens may become less interested in 
upsetting the status quo because they are satisfied with their higher incomes, assuming 
conditions in the country remain stable.  Therefore, citizens might be less interested in 
governance reform as incomes increase.  To investigate this possibility, a measurement of 
state fragility is included.  The results of this study show that state fragility has a 
significant and inverse relationship with three of the six WGIs.  As state fragility 
increases, quality of governance declines in terms of political stability and absence of 
violence, government effectiveness, and regularity quality.  This is not surprising because 
state fragility speaks directly to the strength and capacity of the state.  As state fragility 
increases, it stands to reason that governance quality should decline.  On the other hand, 
the results also indicate that rule of law may increase as state fragility declines.  The 
mechanism for this is unclear, but perhaps as state institutions decline, there is a greater 
focus on rule of law in anticipation of increased crime and violence. State fragility does 
not appear to have a significant relationship with control of corruption. 
Openness to international trade is included in this study because high-quality 
domestic institutions may evolve more quickly in open economies (Islam and 
Montenegro 2002, Al-Marhubi 2004).  This is the case because economic agents have an 
incentive to improve their government institutions to manage risk and to help compete 
more effectively with foreign agents (Islam and Montenegro 2002). The exchange of 
information and learning opportunities between agents in open economies should help to 
bring about better institutions as well (Islam and Montenegro 2002).  The results of this 
study show that while economic openness does have a significant relationship with four 
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of the six WGIs, surprisingly, the relationship appears to be inverse.  This means that as a 
country opens its economy, its quality of governance may actually decline in terms of 
voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, rule of law, and 
control of corruption.  This is opposite of the theoretical expectations and with some 
other studies which find that economic openness is associated with improved governance 
(Brunetti and Weder 1999, Al-Marhubi 2005).  Economic openness does not appear to 
have a significant relationship with government effectiveness or regularity quality.   
Level of education is included in this study as more educated populations usually 
demand a higher level of accountability from government officials, which should result in 
improved governance (Tolbert et al. 2008).  The results of this study show that education 
only seems to affect government effectiveness and regularity quality.  Both are 
significant and the slopes are positive.  As educational attainment increases in a country, 
government effectiveness and regularity quality improves, which is in line with 
theoretical expectations. Education does not appear to have a direct relationship with 
voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, rule of law, or 
control of corruption.   
 Total population is included in this study to represent government resources and 
public services.  Larger countries generally have larger public-sector budgets, better- 
trained staff, and more refined bureaucracies (Garcia-Sanchez et al. 2013).  The results of 
this study show that population has a significant, yet inverse relationship with regularity 
quality, and a significant and direct relationship with rule of law and control of 
corruption.  There does not appear to be a significant relationship with voice and 
accountability, political stability and absence of violence, or government effectiveness.  
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As populations increase, rule of law and control of corruption also improve, but 
regularity quality declines.  In terms of population, larger countries do not necessarily 
have improved voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, or 
government effectiveness.  
A measurement representing freedom of the press is included in this study as a 
free press should help to promote the exchange of information in society and provide the 
public with the information it needs to help hold government officials accountable 
(Djankov et al. 2001).  While it is expected that a freer press should equate with 
improved governance quality, since higher scores for this variable indicate lower levels 
of freedom, and lower scores indicate higher levels of freedom, the statistical relationship 
between the free press variable and the government effectiveness variable should be 
inverse.  The results of this study support this expectation.  Freedom of the press is 
significantly associated with voice and accountability, government effectiveness, 
regularity quality, and rule of law.  As freedom of the press increases, voice and 
accountability, government effectiveness, regularity quality, and rule of law all improve. 
Freedom of the press does not have a significant relationship with political stability and 
absence of violence or control of corruption.  
 A measurement of cell phone penetration rate is included in this study as the 
governments of many countries may restrict access to the internet, and cell phone 
communications applications are increasingly offering citizens another way to share and 
access information with less governmental oversite (Freedom House 2016b).  The results 
of this study show that cell phone penetration rate has a significant and direct relationship 
with regularity quality and rule of law, but is not significantly related to any of the other 
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governance indicators.  As the number of cell phones increase in a country, regularity 
quality and rule of law also increase.  However, there is no evidence that prevalence of 
cell phones has any relationship with voice and accountability, political stability and 
absence of violence, government effectiveness, or control of corruption.  
Contributions of Research 
This study contributes to the research on the factors that affect governance 
quality.  The results of this study show that level of democracy, degree of information 
available to the public, and diversification of the economy all affect at least some aspects 
of governance quality. Furthermore, this research also demonstrates that level of 
economic development, openness to trade, level of education, size of population, freedom 
of the press, cell phone penetration rate, and state fragility all play a role in determining 
quality of governance, depending on which aspect of governance is being assessed.  
Voice and accountability has a direct relationship with level of democracy, level 
of economic development, and freedom of the press, and an inverse relationship with 
openness to trade.  Political stability and absence of violence has a direct relationship 
with level of economic development, and an inverse relationship with openness to trade 
and state fragility.  Governance effectiveness has a direct relationship with information 
available to the public, diversification of the economy, level of economic development, 
level of education, freedom of the press, and an inverse relationship with democracy and 
state fragility.  Regularity quality has a direct relationship with democracy, 
diversification of the economy, level of economic development, level of education, 
freedom of the press, cell phone penetration rate, and an inverse relationship with 
population and state fragility.  Rule of law has a direct relationship with population and 
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state fragility, and an inverse relationship with diversification of the economy, level of 
economic development, openness to trade, freedom of the press, and cell phone 
penetration rate.  Finally, control of corruption has a direct relationship with population, 
and an inverse relationship with diversification of the economy and openness to trade.  
Limitations of Research 
There are three main limitations to this study: limited data availability, 
methodology adjustments for the democracy independent variable, and imperfect proxies.  
For the first limitation, while data on the governance quality dependent variables is 
available for over 200 countries for a period of 20 years, due to restrictions on data 
availability for the independent variables, the analysis in this study is restricted to 143 
countries for a six-year time frame.  In addition, some independent variables had a 
significant number of values missing.  To account for this, two different techniques, 
averaged missing values (AMV) and regressed missing values (RMV), are incorporated 
into the study.  Second, measurements of the democracy variable are static for most 
countries during the period of analysis.  As fixed effects regression analysis is ineffective 
with time-invariant variables, individual cross-sectional regressions are completed for 
each year of the period of analysis, rather than including the democracy variable in the 
fixed effects regressions.  Finally, while all attempts are made to use proxies which best 
represent the factors being assessed in this study, it could be argued that these proxies are 
imperfect representations of the variables of interest.   
Implications for Future Research 
This study raises three main issues that future research should attempt to address.  
First, while the results of this study are informative, they also show that the variables 
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included predict only a small amount of the variation of the governance quality 
indicators.  This means that there are other factors which must affect governance quality 
that are not included in the model.  Future research should strive to identify these factors.  
Second, as new information becomes available, future research should attempt to use 
proxies which more accurately represent the variables under analysis.  Finally, as 
information gathering techniques improve, future research should strive to include a 
greater number of countries over a longer period of time to enhance the statistical validity 
of the research.        
Policy Implications 
The results of this study have a number of implications in terms of governance 
policy.  While correlation doesn’t necessarily imply causation, this study shows that all 
six dimensions of governance quality analyzed may be influenced by at least some 
aspects under the control of policymakers.  To improve citizen’s voice in government and 
to improve government accountability, this study indicates that it may be helpful to 
increase levels of democracy, increase level of economic development, and to expand 
freedom of the press.  All these indicators are shown to have a significant and direct 
relationship with voice and accountability.  However, it should also be noted that greater 
economic openness may result in reduced voice and accountability.  
 To improve political stability and help reduce violence in society, this study 
shows that increasing economic development may be helpful.  Both indicators have a 
significant and direct relationship with political stability and absence of violence.  
However, policymakers should also be aware that political stability may decline and 
violence may worsen as economic openness and state fragility increase.   
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 To enhance government effectiveness, this study shows that increasing 
information available to the public, increasing diversification of the economy, increasing 
level of economic development, increasing level of education, and expanding freedom of 
the press may be helpful.  Although, it is important to note that government effectiveness 
may also be reduced through increased democracy and increased state fragility.  
 To increase regularity quality, this study indicates that increased democracy, 
increased diversification of the economy, increased economic development, increased 
educational attainment, increased freedom of the press, and increased cell phone 
penetration may be helpful.  On the other hand, increased population and increased state 
fragility may also reduce regularity quality.   
 Rule of law may be improved through increased economic development, 
increased population, increased freedom of the press, and increased cell phone 
penetration.  This study shows that these variables all have a significant and direct 
relationship with rule of law.  However, policymakers should also note that rule of law 
may decline with increased democracy, increased diversification of the economy, 
increased economic openness, and increased state fragility.  
 Finally, control of corruption is shown to be difficult to address through the 
mechanisms studied.  While diversification of the economy and increased economic 
openness may help to improve corruption, control of corruption may also decline as 
populations increase.  The other variables in the study do not appear to play a significant 
role in control of corruption.  
 
 
  
 
73 
 
 
APPENDIX A – Country Data Set 
Following is the list of 143 countries appearing in this data set.  
Afghanistan 
Albania 
Algeria 
Angola 
Argentina 
Armenia 
Australia 
Austria 
Azerbaijan 
Bahrain 
Bangladesh 
Belarus 
Belgium 
Benin 
Bhutan 
Bolivia 
Botswana 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cambodia 
Cameroon 
Canada 
Cape Verde 
Central African 
Republic 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Comoros 
Congo, Rep. 
Costa Rica 
Côte d'Ivoire 
Croatia 
Cyprus 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Dominican Repubic 
Ecuador 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 
El Salvador 
Estonia 
Ethiopia 
Fiji 
Finland 
France 
Gabon 
Gambia, The 
Georgia 
Germany 
Ghana 
Greece 
Guatemala 
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Guinea 
Guyana 
Honduras 
Hungary 
India 
Indonesia 
Ireland 
Israel 
Italy 
Jamaica 
Japan 
Jordan 
Kazakhstan 
Kenya 
Korea, Rep. 
Kuwait 
Kyrgyz Republic 
Lao PDR 
Latvia 
Lebanon 
Lesotho 
Libya 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Malaysia 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Mexico 
Moldova 
Mongolia 
Montenegro 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Myanmar 
Namibia 
Nepal 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Nicaragua 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Norway 
Oman 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Poland 
Portugal 
Qatar 
Romania 
Russian Federation 
Rwanda 
Saudi Arabia 
Senegal 
Serbia 
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Sierra Leone 
Singapore 
Slovak Republic 
Slovenia 
Solomon Islands 
South Africa 
Spain 
Sri Lanka 
Sudan 
Suriname 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Tanzania 
Thailand 
Timor-Leste 
Togo 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Uganda 
Ukraine 
United Arab Emirates 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Uruguay 
Venezuela, RB 
Vietnam 
Yemen, Rep. 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
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APPENDIX B - Countries Not Used in Data Set 
Following is the list of 46 countries not used in this study. 
American Samoa 
Andorra 
Anguilla 
Aruba 
Antigua and Barbuda 
Bermuda 
Bahamas, The 
Barbados 
Brunei Darussalam 
Cayman Islands 
Chad 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 
Cook Islands 
Djibouti 
Dominica 
Eritrea 
Gabon 
Grenada 
Greenland 
French Guiana 
Guam 
Equatorial Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
Haiti 
Jersey, Channel Islands 
Liechtenstein 
Kosovo 
Macedonia, FYR 
Marshall Islands 
Martinique 
Micronesia, Fed. Sts. 
Monaco 
Nauru 
Netherlands Antilles 
(former) 
Niue 
Palau 
Papua New Guinea 
Réunion 
San Marino 
São Tomé and Principe 
Syrian Arab Republic 
Taiwan, China 
South Sudan 
Tuvalu 
West Bank and Gaza 
Virgin Islands (U.S.) 
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APPENDIX C – Dissertation Data Sources and Descriptions 
Table A1.  
Variable Name, Type, Description, and Source 
Name Type Description Source 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI)  
VOI DV Voice and accountability. Perceptions 
regarding freedom of expression, freedom 
of association, freedom of the media, and 
the ability of citizens to choose their own 
government. 
World Bank (2015) 
POL DV Political stability and absence of violence. 
Perceptions of political instability, including 
politically-motivated violence and terrorism.   
World Bank (2015) 
GOV DV Government effectiveness. Perceptions of 
quality in areas such as public services, civil 
services, policy formation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the 
government’s commitment to these policies.   
World Bank (2015) 
REG DV Regularity quality. Perceptions of the 
presence of market-friendly government 
policies and regulations. 
World Bank (2015) 
RUL DV Rule of law. Perceptions around how well 
the rules of society are obeyed, including 
the enforcement of contracts, confidence in 
the courts and police, and expectations of 
crime and violence.   
World Bank (2015) 
COR DV Control of corruption. Perceptions regarding 
the degree to which public power is used to 
advance private interests through both petty 
and grand forms of corruption and state 
capture 
World Bank (2015) 
DEM IV Level of democracy is represented by data 
from the Polity IV Project which assesses 
institutionalized democracy in each country.  
Marshall et al. 
(2016) 
INF IV Level of information available to the public 
is represented by data on the percentage of 
individuals using the internet. 
International 
Telecommunications 
Union (2016b) 
DIV IV Diversification of the economy is 
represented by the number of unique 
harmonized system (HS) product codes 
exported by country. 
World Bank (2017).   
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ECO IV Level of economic development is 
represented by GDP per capita. 
World Bank (2016b) 
OPE IV Economic openness is represented by 
percent of GDP attributed to trade. 
World Bank (2016d) 
EDU IV Level of education is represented by a 
combination of the mean years of schooling 
and expected years of schooling by country.   
United Nations 
Human 
Development 
Programme (2016) 
POP IV Total population by country.  World Bank (2016c) 
FRE IV Freedom of the press which represents the 
degree of freedom in each country in terms 
of print, broadcast and digital media. 
Freedom House 
(2016) 
CEL IV Cell phone penetration which reports the 
number of cell phone subscriptions per 
capita.  
International 
Telecommunications 
Union (2016a) 
FRA IV State fragility is represented by the Fragile 
States Index which assesses state failure risk 
along 12 different indicators, such as 
corruption and criminal behavior, inability 
to collect taxes, and severe demographic 
pressures.  
Fund for Peace 
(2017) 
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